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This thesis examined whether there is sufficient authority for interstate law enforcement 
mutual aid to respond to a Mumbai-style attack occurring in the United States. Several 
existing interstate mutual aid systems were examined to determine if they could be 
enacted on short notice and provide adequate authority and protections for the responding 
officers in a no-notice event. This thesis found that the existing systems for natural 
disasters and planned events were slow to implement and would not provide the authority 
and protections required for response to a no-notice event. Our conclusion is that the law 
enforcement community should create a new national compact that will facilitate the 
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This thesis examines how law enforcement officers could be provided appropriate 
authority and legal protection to quickly and efficiently provide interstate mutual aid in a 
no-notice event, such as a Mumbai-style attack or other incidents that require a rapid law 
enforcement surge capacity.  
Interstate mutual aid has improved significantly over the last 15 years through the 
adoption of compacts such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), 
along with increases in capability and coordinated planning. These improvements have 
provided increased authority for mutual aid, assured workers compensation and other 
benefits for responders, and streamlined the mutual aid request process. Despite these 
improvements, gaps continue to be identified in disaster after action reports and are 
evident during special events. Some of these gaps are directly related to law enforcement 
authority. 
Law enforcement mutual aid is different from other disciplines as it requires that 
officers have the proper law enforcement legal authority when they enter another 
jurisdiction. This authority comes from statutes and other laws, and it is usually specific 
rather than general in its enactment. 
There are a number of systems in place for response to natural disasters. EMAC 
and the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact grant law enforcement powers, 
including the power of arrest, but only during the response to declared emergencies. 
Governors have used executive orders to extend law enforcement powers to respond to 
elevated then Homeland Security Advisory System threat levels. National special security 
events (NSSEs), such as the presidential nominating conventions, have required large 
numbers of extraterritorial law enforcement officers to secure the event. In order to grant 
law enforcement powers to responding law enforcement officers, the U.S. Secret Service 
deputized the officers as temporary federal marshals. Some states have laws that allow 
municipalities to enter into mutual aid agreements with out of state responders that will 
grant law enforcement powers. While each of these accomplishes the goal of providing 
 xii
law enforcement authority, these approaches are applicable to limited circumstances and 
are not readily adaptable for short notice implementation that may be required for a 
Mumbai-style attack or other no-notice event. 
Each of these systems is examined to determine if they provide a framework that 
includes  
 quick implementation; 
 implementation at the lowest level; 
 seamless grant of law enforcement authority; and, 
 resolution of issues of liability, pension, and workers compensation. 
While each of the systems covers some of these elements, none of the systems are 
currently capable of providing for response to a no-notice event, either because they do 
not provide all of the elements or because they are not widespread enough. 
Compacts, such as EMAC, require the declaration of an emergency, and they are 
not quick to implement or capable of being implemented at the lowest possible level. In 
addition, compacts do appear to provide a seamless grant of authority, yet some states 
have used a duplicative swearing when accepting aid under EMAC, questioning whether 
this grant of authority is effective. Compacts delineate responsibility for liability, workers 
compensation, and other benefits.  
Executive orders are not quick to implement as a governor is required to enact the 
order. Because they are enacted by the governor, they do not allow implementation at the 
lowest possible level. Executive orders do provide a seamless grant of authority and for 
liability, workers compensation, and other benefits usually by having the responding state 
retain responsibility.  
The system used for NSSE is not quick to implement nor implemented at lowest 
possible level as action by the federal government is required to grant the power. The 
NSSE system provides a limited grant of law enforcement authority through the use of 
deputation by the U. S. Marshals Service—a deputation that is limited in terms of the 
state and local laws that could be enforced. The NSSE system provides for liability, 
workers compensation, and other benefits by providing federal coverage.  
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State laws allow enactment and implementation at the lowest possible level as all 
necessary agreements and requests are made by the local governments who require the 
mutual aid. State laws provide a seamless grant of law enforcement authority; however, 
this grant will be different from state to state, based on the details of each state’s law. 
State laws often require provisions to be included in memoranda of agreements detailing 
the coverage for liability, workers compensation and other benefits. However, the state 
laws are not universal throughout the nation and require action by many local 
governments to provide for an effective system. 
In order to provide the proper legal framework to facilitate interstate response to 
no-notice events, such as a Mumbai-style attack, this thesis recommends that associations 
representing state, county, and local law enforcement agencies should develop a law 
enforcement compact that will address the concerns unique to law enforcement mutual 
aid. These associations are best suited to balance the interested of law enforcement 
agencies from different states and amongst the different types of law enforcement 
agencies. This new compact will need to be passed by at least two states and then 
submitted to Congress for approval. While this multi-layered legislative process may take 
a considerable amount of time; developing the core principles of the compact today will 
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On November 28, 2008, 10 terrorists took the city of Mumbai, India, captive in an 
unprecedented and unparalleled terrorist attack. This meticulously planned attack has left 
open the question of whether such an attack could be launched in the United States. If the 
United States was attacked in this manner, would our law enforcement mutual aid system 
be capable of summoning the appropriate assistance from across state lines? 
The 10 terrorists in Mumbai planted bombs and used small weapons such as 
handguns, rifles, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and grenades to terrorize and kill 
while lighting buildings on fire in their wake (Rabasa et al., 2009, pp. 4–5). This attack 
overwhelmed the Mumbai law enforcement authorities, rendering them incapable of 
mounting a consolidated or integrated response (Shankar & Somayaji, 2008). The 
weapons and communication capabilities of the attackers were significantly superior to 
those immediately available to law enforcement. The chaos created by the attack and lack 
of organized communication capacity by law enforcement delayed both response and 
rescue. This attack resulted in 172 deaths and 293 injuries and terrorized Mumbai for 36 
hours (New York Police Department [NYPD] Intelligence Division, 2008).  
This attack was meticulously planned in Pakistan, and it was designed to render 
the response difficult and ineffective (Rabasa et al., 2009, p. 7). The terrorists arrived in 
Mumbai as one group and then proceeded to split into smaller groups. This created 
several attack teams moving around the city with multiple incident scenes. The terrorists 
also left bombs in taxi cabs that exploded significant distances from where they were 
originally placed in the cabs. This distributed attack methodology added to the first 
responders’ confusion (NYPD Intelligence Division, 2008). 
The police in Mumbai were unable to address the unfolding terrorist attack. They 
were outgunned, initially responding with only batons (Shankar & Somayaji, 2008). Once 
armed police responded, their weapons were still no match for the AK-56 assault rifles, 
grenades, and IEDs of the terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2009, p. 4). It took nearly 11 hours for 
the specialized commando team to respond from New Delhi nearly 900 miles away 
(Balachandran, 2010, p. 4). The Mumbai police had no effective command and control 
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structure to deal with the attack (Sullivan & Elkus, 2009, p. 2). The terrorists ultimately 
took their final stand in a number of locations spread throughout the city, stretching the 
police force to address multiple incident scenes. 
What would happen if such an attack were launched in the United States? Would 
law enforcement be unable to efficiently counter the terrorists as in Mumbai? An attack 
such as this would require a law enforcement response that would likely exceed the 
capabilities that many local law enforcement agencies could muster themselves. Law 
enforcement mutual aid would be required to respond quickly and efficiently. If the 
closest mutual aid was across state lines, is there sufficient authority to allow the law 
enforcement officers1 to respond without concern regarding what authority they possess, 
whether they would be covered for injuries sustained, or if their pension and insurance 
benefits would be available if they are injured or killed? If law enforcement agencies 
respond across a state border without proper legal authority, they could face potential 
lawsuits claiming unlawful arrest from innocent citizens detained during the response. 
If the city of Philadelphia in the state of Pennsylvania were to be the target of 
such an attack, would the city of Camden, a mere half mile across the river in the state of 
New Jersey, be able to send law enforcement officers to provide mutual aid? The 
Camden officers are much closer to parts of Philadelphia than many other law 
enforcement agencies in Pennsylvania are, so their response would be faster. Were such 
an attack to occur and the Camden officers unable to respond, it would be hard to justify 
after the incident that the lack of planning prevented additional much needed resources 
from being rapidly summoned. 
In the absence of a terrorist attack, there are many events and incidents that 
require law enforcement mutual aid across state lines, some of which provide solutions 
for interstate law enforcement mutual aid that work well for the specific type of event. 
National special security events (NSSEs), such as the presidential nominating 
conventions and inaugurations, regularly occur and often require significant law 
                                                 
1 The term “law enforcement officers” is used to refer to those government officials who are charged 
with providing day-to-day law enforcement in communities across the country. It is recognized that 
different states use different terminology to refer to such officers, such as police officers, peace officers, 




enforcement mutual aid to properly address potential threats and security concerns. 
Severe weather and manmade hazards may also require response across state lines to save 
lives and protect public safety.  
Terrorism and lone shooter events also demonstrate a need for interstate mutual 
aid. Elevated threat levels near or across state lines may require the seamless movement 
of law enforcement officers across the border on trains, ferries, or other modes of 
transportation. Recent lone wolf shooter incidents in schools and public places have 
demonstrated the need for large scale law enforcement response.2  
While the solutions for natural disasters and planned events appear to work well 
for those events, are there adequate authorities for responding to the type of attack that 
was unleashed on Mumbai? Ideally, one solution would provide adequate law 
enforcement authority and protections both for natural disasters and no-notice terrorist 
attacks; however, there may not be one solution that fits all situations. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As part of its post Hurricane Katrina preparedness mission, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) includes mutual aid as a component of overall 
national preparedness. Mutual aid is recognized in the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) as one of the elements contributing to an effective response capability 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008b, p. 18). NIMS encourages first 
responders, policy makers, and elected officials to develop robust mutual aid capabilities 
(DHS, 2008b, p. 18). The National Response Framework (NRF) recognizes interstate 
mutual aid as a tool for providing necessary resources when an incident exceeds tribal, 
territorial, local or state capabilities (DHS, 2013, pp. 26–27).  
The president, in Presidential Preparedness Directive 8 (PPD-8) recognized that 
“national preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private 
and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens” (White House, 2011, p. 1). PPD-8 directs 
                                                 
2 While the focus of this thesis is on the active response to events, specialized investigative units may 
also be required to respond as mutual aid once an event has been resolved. A robust mutual aid system will 
allow these types of assets to be shared, eliminating unnecessary duplication and saving diminishing grant 
funding for greater needs. 
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the creation of a national preparedness system designed to help prepare and equip 
national capabilities. One method for enhancing national preparedness is through the 
sharing of resources pursuant to mutual aid agreements.  
It is important to note at the outset that law enforcement mutual aid is different 
from other disciplines as it requires the officers have the proper law enforcement legal 
authority when they enter another jurisdiction. This authority will come from statutes and 
other laws and is usually specific rather than a general in its enactment. 
One form of mutual aid planning recognized by NIMS is a mutual aid agreement: 
Mutual aid agreements and assistance agreements are agreements between 
agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions that provide a mechanism to 
quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, 
materials, and other associated services. The primary objective is to 
facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support prior to, 
during, and after an incident. (DHS, 2008b, p. 18)  
Properly drafted, a mutual aid agreement is one type of authority for mutual aid 
that could be used in a Mumbai-style attack or non-emergency event assuming it is based 
upon valid underlying legal authority. Elements that NIMS recommends be included in 
the mutual aid agreement include: procedures for requesting assistance, allocation of 
workers compensation, liability and immunities, and recognition of licenses and 
authorities (DHS, 2008b, p. 18). 
The federal government has highlighted the necessity of interstate mutual aid 
planning as a homeland security building block. The Secretary of Homeland Security in 
the FY 2013 National Preparedness Grant Program Vision Document proposes to 
“require that resources, regardless of funding source, are complementary and that mutual 
aid and similar agreements allow for their use across jurisdictional boundaries for a wide 
range of threats and hazards” (DHS, 2012, p. 4). States will also be required to maintain 
membership in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as a condition 
of receiving homeland security grant funds (DHS, 2012, p. 4).  
While the federal government is highlighting the need for interstate mutual aid 
such as EMAC, states cannot enter into mutual aid agreements directly—congressional 
approval is required. This is due to the Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the United States 
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Constitution, commonly known as the Compact Clause, which provides, “No State shall, 
without the consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 10). 
The Supreme Court found that this clause does not prevent agreements between 
the States on all subjects, just those that would increase the powers of the States. In 
Virginia v. Tennessee, the Court found:  
It is evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any 
combination tending to the increase of political power in the states, which 
may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United 
States. (Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 1893) 
Mutual aid agreements provide, among other things, law enforcement officers from one 
state to another, thereby increasing the police power of the states.  
Congress has approved many interstate compacts, but only a few that have 
directly impacted emergency mutual aid. According to the Council of State Governments, 
there were over 200 active compacts in 2012 (Council of State Governments, n.d.). Of 
these 200, only two provide for interstate mutual aid in emergencies: the Interstate Civil 
Defense and Disaster Compact (ICDDC) and EMAC. 
Prior to September 11, 2011, authority for interstate mutual aid was sporadic and 
varied. The ICDDC, authorized in the 1950s, provided the framework for interstate 
mutual aid agreements (N.J.S. 38A:20-3). However, only half of the states adopted the 
compact (National Center for Interstate Compacts, 2011). By the early 1990s, it was clear 
this inconsistent and sporadic adoption rendered the ICDDC impotent to respond to a 
major national disaster.  
Responding to Hurricane Andrew in August 1992, the emergency managers in 
Florida and other southern states discovered there was no standard mutual aid agreement 
adopted by the 50 states that allowed all of the needed assets to respond across state lines 
(National Emergency Management Association, n.d.). Following Hurricane Andrew, the 
governors and emergency management directors in the southeastern United States began 
to review how to improve response to large scale disasters. Governor Lawton Chiles of 
Florida requested that the Southern Governors’ Association (SGA) examine the ability of 
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the southern states to assist each other during emergencies (Cook, 2009). One 
recommendation from the SGA was to enact a mutual aid agreement amongst the 
southern states that would address issues such as tort liability of responders, the 
recognition of licenses from one state to another, and the ability to move much needed 
response assets across state lines. This agreement was initially known as the Southern 
Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact,3 the predecessor of EMAC.4 
Since September 11, 2011, inter-state mutual aid has improved significantly 
through the adoption EMAC and through increases in capability and through coordinated 
planning. These improvements provide: increased authority for mutual aid; assuring 
workers compensation and other benefits for first responders; addressing tort liability; 
and streamlining the mutual aid request process. However, gaps still remain in the ability 
to provide mutual aid response, and these gaps have been identified in disaster after 
action reports, lessons learned, and are evident during special events. 
Despite the improvements in mutual aid post September 11, when Hurricane 
Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, mutual aid was again the subject of much criticism and 
questioning (White House, 2006). Particularly criticized was the law enforcement mutual 
aid provided by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to the affected areas of 
Louisiana and Mississippi (Smith & Rojek, 2006). The White House, in its review of the 
response to Hurricane Katrina recognized: 
The final structural flaw in our current system for national preparedness is 
the weakness of our regional planning and coordination structures. 
Guidance to governments at all levels is essential to ensure adequate 
preparedness for major disasters across the Nation. To this end, the 
Interim National Preparedness Goal (NPG) and Target Capabilities List 
(TCL) can assist Federal, State, and local governments to: identify and 
define required capabilities and what levels of those capabilities are 
needed; establish priorities within a resource-constrained environment; 
clarify and understand roles and responsibilities in the national network of 
homeland security capabilities; and develop mutual aid agreements. 
(White House, 2006, p. 53) 
                                                 
3 This agreement was never approved by Congress as required by the Compact Clause of the United 
States Constitution and therefore was not properly a compact.  




While the White House identified a need for mutual aid agreements post-Katrina, 
a congressional report recognized interstate mutual aid as one of the successes in the 
response: 
Finding: EMAC and military assistance were critical for restoring law and 
order. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), the 
state to state assistance compact, facilitated the deployment of resources to 
the hardest hit regions. (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, p. 249) 
While in conflict, the White House and congressional reports both recognize the value of 
effective interstate mutual aid agreements. 
Law enforcement mutual aid is different from other disciplines as it requires the 
officers have the proper law enforcement legal authority when they enter another 
jurisdiction. Law enforcement authority is granted, generally speaking, by state and 
federal laws.  
Federal law enforcement officers derive their authority from federal law (Seitz, 
2012). This can be broad in scope like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which 
is able to enforce all criminal laws, or limited in scope like the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG), which enforces federal law on the water (14 U.S.C. 2). Federal law enforcement 
officers cannot enforce state laws unless there is specific state authorization to do so. In 
New Jersey, for example, certain federal law enforcement officers are empowered to 
enforce third degree or higher crimes (N.J.S. 2A:154-5). In practical terms, this means 
that federal law enforcement officers may not enforce misdemeanors or minor criminal 
violations in New Jersey. In New Jersey, this authority exists at all times, not just during 
emergencies. While not significant on a day-to-day basis, this could prove problematic in 
some circumstances such as during a disaster response when ability to enforce lesser 
crimes is required.   
During Hurricane Katrina, the limitations on federal law enforcement officers 
were evident and created problems (Smith & Rojek, 2006). The issues were significant 
enough that the U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, on May 31, 2006, wrote to the 
governors of all 50 states requesting that they review and update their laws to allow for 
federal law enforcement aid in the event of a disaster (Gonzales, 2007). Attorney General 
Gonzalez sought to create a federal law enforcement response that was better coordinated 
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and as expeditious as possible. Through pre-event planning, the attorney general desired 
to improve the federal response. Again in 2007 and 2012, the Justice Department reached 
out to the state attorneys general and requested that the states review its laws to assure 
that federal law enforcement could be provided post disaster (Gonzales, 2007). 
State and local law enforcement officers receive their authority from state laws. 
These laws are limited in both scope and geographic jurisdiction (N.J.S. 40A:14-152.1). 
The scope of the authority is varied. For example, in some states, the officers possess law 
enforcement authority at all times throughout the state (N.J.S. 40A:14-152.1). Other 
states limit the geographic scope of law enforcement officers to particular counties. 
While compacts are approved by Congress, they must also be enacted by state 
legislatures to provide the state legal framework for the work to be performed by the 
compact. 
Along with recognizing licenses and other powers, EMAC provides for state law 
enforcement authority, including the power of arrest—but only during a response to 
declared emergencies (Emergency Management Assistance Compact). These compacts 
require a declaration of an emergency prior to mutual aid being provided. An emergency 
declaration is not always available for interstate law enforcement mutual aid during no-
notice events, such as a Mumbai-style attack or planned events, such as NSSEs. NSSEs, 
such as the presidential nominating conventions, have required large numbers of out-of-
state law enforcement officers to secure the event (Reese, 2009, p. 2). In order to grant 
law enforcement powers to out-of-state law enforcement officers for NSSEs, the U.S. 
Secret Service (USSS) will usually request to have the officers deputized as temporary 
federal marshals (Connors, 2007). While accomplishing the goal of providing law 
enforcement authority, these approaches are applicable only to limited circumstances and 
are not readily adaptable for short notice implementation that would be required by an 
elevated threat levels or emerging incident, such as a Mumbai-style attack. 
The improvements in interstate mutual aid over the last several years have 
focused on response to catastrophic events, such as Hurricane Katrina or the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. It is not clear that these improvements will assist with law 
enforcement mutual aid for a Mumbai-style attack, for special events, for law 
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enforcement activity due to elevated threat levels, or other prevention activity. The 
solutions for pre-emergency mutual aid are not expedient and, in some cases, may suffer 
legal infirmities. The development of solutions that provide the expedient provision of 
pre-emergency mutual aid that are solidly founded in law should be a homeland security 
priority. New solutions could fill the gaps in the current interstate mutual aid systems, 
which would allow state and local governments to plan effective responses to events and 
incidents across all of the homeland security mission areas. New solutions could also 
facilitate quicker implementation of protective measures required for elevated threat 
levels and other emergent conditions. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can law enforcement officers be provided appropriate authority and legal 
protection to quickly and efficiently provide interstate mutual aid when required by no-
notice events, such as a Mumbai-style attack, or similar events and incidents that require 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Interstate law enforcement mutual aid presents unique challenges for state and 
local governments since law enforcement authority is granted by state laws and does not 
easily transcend state borders. Events such as the response to Hurricane Katrina and 
orange threat levels on interstate transportation have highlighted the need for a smooth 
and efficient method to provide law enforcement assistance across state lines. While there 
seems to be sufficient authority for post-disaster response, the authority for prevention or 
protection activities is still lacking. 
There is not a significant amount of literature on the subject of interstate law 
enforcement mutual aid. The available literature consists of legal source materials such as 
laws and compacts, along with after action reports and other operational analysis. The 
laws and compacts provide legal solutions for providing law enforcement assistance 
across state lines. The after action reports and other operational analysis generally 
analyze how aid was provided in response to a specific event. The literature mostly 
discusses post-disaster mutual aid not pre-event prevention capability demonstrating a 
larger gap for elevated threat levels, non-emergency aid, and special events.  
Congress created the Office of State and Local Law Enforcement, a law 
enforcement advocacy office, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). One 
responsibility of this office is to:  
Conduct, jointly with the Administrator, a study to determine the efficacy 
and feasibility of establishing specialized law enforcement deployment 
teams to assist State, local, and tribal governments in responding to natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters …. (6 U.S.C. § 
607, n.d.)  
The office noted in its report to Congress: 
Both the inter-State law enforcement surge to Katrina and the professional 
opinions of national law enforcement leadership make it clear that 
significant improvements to large scale inter-State law enforcement 
capability are both desirable and possible. (FEMA, 2009, p. 10) 
This report to Congress was based upon a joint position paper developed by the 
Major City Chiefs and Major County Sheriffs. In this position paper, the authors 
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recognized that if law enforcement deployments teams are established, “Team members 
should carry weapons, and have the authority to detain or arrest and use force, including 
deadly force, if necessary” (Major City Chiefs, Major County Sheriffs Associations, 
2007, p. 4). 
The legal authorities are subcategorized into general categories: interstate 
compacts, executive orders, memoranda of understanding, and state laws. Each category 
approaches interstate law enforcement mutual aid in a different way. The interstate 
compacts provide ability to move assets including law enforcement across state lines. 
Generally, these focus on post-disaster aid as opposed to prevention or protection 
activities. Executive orders use a variety of state laws and gubernatorial powers to 
provide response into a state. The memoranda of understanding provide law enforcement 
mutual aid for large scale events in prevention or protection activities. The state laws 
focus on providing aid across common borders, either at a state or local levels.  
A. INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
The primary compact legal authority for post-disaster interstate mutual aid is 
EMAC, a national compact that applies to all forms of mutual aid and does provide 
specific authority for law enforcement:  
Each party state shall afford to the emergency forces of any party state, 
while operating within its state limits under the terms and conditions of 
this compact, the same powers (except that of arrest unless specifically 
authorized by the receiving state), duties, rights, and privileges as are 
afforded forces of the state in which they are performing emergency 
services. (Emergency Management Assistance Compact, n.d.).  
EMAC was modeled after the ICDDC, which contains the identical provision 
regarding law enforcement and the power of arrest. These sections require a specific 
grant of authority for the power of arrest, but they are silent as to how this is to be 
granted.  
Post event after action reports generally tend to contain short mentions of 
successes or problems, with little detail of the underlying facts or law. The primary after 
action reports come from the responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, A 
Failure of Initiative, the House Committee Report on Hurricane Katrina recognized that 
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there were limitations on the ability of existing laws to provide law enforcement mutual 
aid: 
The EMAC process was not always smooth. For example, a sheriff from 
Michigan and a sheriff from Alabama were at the Louisiana border but 
could not assist because no EMAC request had been made. The Jefferson 
Parish Sheriff had apparently not made a request through the state EOC 
for the assistance—a requirement for providing law enforcement 
assistance through EMAC. (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, p. 252) 
The difficulty in providing law enforcement assistance was not limited to state 
and local police; the federal officers responding to Katrina also had problems: “The 
process for federal law enforcement being deputized or sworn in as a peace officer under 
state law in Louisiana and Mississippi proved cumbersome for some entities.” (U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2006, p. 256). Similarly, the White House report on Hurricane 
Katrina found coordination of law enforcement powers to be lacking, and it characterized 
the federal deputation process as cumbersome and inefficient (White House, 2006, p. 58). 
Neither of these reports offers suggestions on how to deal with the “cumbersome” 
process to deputize out-of-state and federal law enforcement officers other than general 
suggestions to create better coordination. 
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the administrators of EMAC conducted 
an after action conference to examine the operational successes and areas of improvement 
for the multi-state response. The EMAC Hurricane After Action Report found as one of 
the successes that: “Law enforcement officers, whose police powers remain in effect 
under EMAC, were also sworn as Louisiana officers, ensuring there would be no 
question regarding their legitimate authority” (National Emergency Management 
Association, 2006, p. 3–15). Another success touted that “Granting deployed law 
enforcement officers powers of arrest in Louisiana eliminated any potential doubt 
regarding the legitimacy of their authority” (National Emergency Management 
Association, 2006, p. 4–17). These after action findings beg the question why the officers 
needed to be deputized. On its face, the compact grants law enforcement power so why 
was the additional step of deputizing necessary? Does this mean that the post-disaster 
powers are not as robust as needed? 
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B. EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Based upon the ICDDC, the governor of New Jersey issued executive orders to 
allow for interstate law enforcement efforts during orange threat levels.5 Similarly, in the 
past the governor of New York used his emergency powers to waive law enforcement 
training requirements allowing out-of-state law enforcement officers to patrol trains and 
ferries into New York City. Both of these solutions have provided temporary fixes to the 
problem of providing law enforcement assistance across state lines. 
C. MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT 
Over the years, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has examined NSSEs 
several times, which the USSS is in charge of by statute (18 U.S.C. 3056(e), n.d.). One of 
the findings by CRS regarding reimbursement of law enforcement at these events is “… 
USSS did not have a mechanism to reimburse state and local law enforcement entities for 
NSSE costs.” (Reese, 2009, p. 3). Similar findings were found in predecessor reports in 
2008 and 2007 (Reese, 2007, p. 5; 2008, p. 13). 
D. STATE LAWS 
Mutual aid laws enacted by individual states allow cross border law enforcement 
mutual aid. For example, a Montana statute allows law enforcement agencies to enter into 
mutual aid agreements with law enforcement agencies in other states. It states,  
Mutual aid agreement may grant a peace officer of any party law 
enforcement agency acting within the territorial jurisdiction of any other 
party law enforcement agency authority to act as if he were a duly 
appointed and qualified peace officer of the law enforcement agency he is 
assisting. (Montana Code § 44-11-304, n.d.)  
This statute, and the resulting mutual aid agreements, allow for mutual aid across state 
lines on a local basis. 
As part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
Congress created specific authority for mutual aid in the National Capitol Region. This 
act allows state and local governments in the region to take advantage of its provisions. 
                                                 
5 Orange threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System, replaced by the National Threat 
Advisory System (DHS, n.d. b). 
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This act specifically authorizes grants of reciprocal powers across the various 
jurisdictions (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). No other part 
of the nation has similar authority. The act specifically excludes “special events of 
national significance under section 3056(3) of title 18 United States Code, or other law 
enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service,” excluding many prevention 















This thesis uses a policy options analysis, examining existing policy and 
proposing options for new policy. Examining the policy options would allow states and 
law enforcement agencies to develop solutions that could allow for quick and efficient 
mutual aid for future events. Existing systems for providing law enforcement mutual aid 
will be examined to determine if they could be used for a Mumbai-style attack. 
These systems will be examined to determine if they provide a framework that 
includes:  
 Quick implementation; 
 Implementation at the lowest level; 
 Seamless grant of law enforcement authority; and, 
 Resolution of issues of liability, pension and workers compensation 
In the absence of an existing solutions, alternative solutions developed by states 
or law enforcement agencies must have a sound legal foundation. This foundation must 
be defensible in court in the event of litigation. The foundation may include, but not be 
limited to: federal laws, interstate compacts, state laws, executive orders, or memoranda 
of agreement. Federal statutes, interstate compacts, and state statutes must be clear and 
unambiguous in granting law enforcement powers to responding officers. They must 
clearly state any limitations on the powers being granted, for example, the types of laws 
that may be enforced. 
Executive orders must be based upon state laws that allow the signatory to grant 
the powers that the executive order is granting. If the person granting the power to law 
enforcement is not authorized to do so, any grant of power is meaningless and will likely 
be set aside in a criminal or civil proceeding. Generally speaking, the authority to enter 
the executive order will come from statutes and other laws. 
Memoranda of agreement must also be backed by law, both that the person 
signing has sufficient authority to do so and for the powers granted (Lynn, 2005). If there 
is no underlying legal authority for granting power in the memoranda or the 
accompanying deputation, the grant of power will be ineffective. Similarly, if the person 
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signing the memoranda is not authorized to do so, the governing body can, and may be 
required to, repudiate the agreement after it has been relied upon. 
There is little guidance available for the granting of law enforcement powers to 
responding mutual aid forces. There is no standardized metrics or criteria for measuring 
effectiveness or efficiency of any grant of power. However, there is general guidance for 
the drafting of mutual aid legislation or agreements, to include checklists of key parts that 
should be included (Stier, 2007). Key areas identified for drafting such laws or 
agreements include: 
 agreement purpose or background  
 organization and coordination  
 request and response procedures  
 licenses and permits  
 liability, immunity, and indemnity  
 costs and reimbursement  
 legal scope or effect  
 workers’ compensation, death benefits, and insurance dispute resolution  
 fees, funding, and appropriations  
 supplemental agreements or parties amendments  
 effective date, term of agreement, and withdrawal signatories  
 definitions [emphasis added] (Stier, 2007).  
This general guidance references licenses and permits as well as legal scope and effect. 
Both of these are directly relevant to law enforcement authority. 
There are a number of existing solutions that will be reviewed. These include 
compacts (including EMAC and ICDDC), state laws, executive orders, and memoranda 
of agreement. State laws to be examined include laws from Montana, New Jersey, and 
New York. In addition, executive orders by the governors of New York and New Jersey 
providing law enforcement authority in the greater New York City area will be examined. 
Last, the USSS memorandum of agreement for NSSEs will be examined along with the 
accompanying deputation process. 
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In order to determine whether the existing methods will work for a Mumbai-style 
attack, the following questions will be answered for each: 
 Could mutual aid be implemented quickly and efficiently; does it require a 
declaration of emergency or other action that may delay response? 
 Could mutual aid be implemented at the lowest possible level, such as the 
local police chief or sheriff? Does it require application to state or federal 
government officials to implement? 
 Is a clear grant of seamless authority provided to the law enforcement 
agencies responding to a request for mutual aid? 
 Does the solution delineate responsibility for liability, workers 
compensation and other benefits? 
Answering these questions will provide insight as to whether the proposed mutual aid 

















A. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Current methods for providing law enforcement law enforcement mutual aid 
across state lines are varied and limited in application. This inconsistent approach makes 
the overall law enforcement mutual aid system inefficient and cumbersome. Most 
existing systems of providing interstate law enforcement mutual aid were designed for 
natural hazards or planned events, not for the sudden onslaught similar to a Mumbai-style 
attack. In order to provide quick and efficient mutual aid, a better method is needed. 
State law enforcement officers derive their power from state statutes. Absent a 
grant of power, law enforcement officers do not have legal authority to enforce the law 
beyond that of any ordinary citizen. Federal law enforcement officers are empowered by 
federal law to enforce federal criminal law nationwide but, in the absence of a grant of 
authority by a state, are powerless to enforce state criminal law. Even when the authority 
is given to federal law enforcement officers to enforce state laws, the grant is often 
limited to specific types of crimes (N.J.S. 2A:154-5).  
This limitation of state-based law enforcement authority is one of the basic 
constitutional tenets. Our founding fathers created a system in which the power to police 
was reserved to the states. In, United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court recognized 
“[t]he principle that the Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers 
while reserving a generalized police power to the States is deeply ingrained in our 
constitutional history” (United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 2000) 
State law enforcement officers are limited in authority by their empowering 
statutes. State statutes only provide authority within a state and do not extend beyond that 
state borders. Once state or local law enforcement officers cross a state line, they retain 
the right to carry a weapon but have no authority to enforce state laws in the state they 
have entered. The authority for officers to carry their weapons outside of their home 
jurisdictions was granted by Congress in the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (18 
U.S. Code 926B and 926C, n.d.). While the act grants the right to carry weapons across 
state lines, it does not provide the power of arrest or grant law enforcement powers. 
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Concerns regarding liability, workers compensation protection, and the ability to 
prosecute cases necessitate that law enforcement officers are fully and legally empowered 
wherever and whenever they are called upon to operate outside their home jurisdiction 
(Major City Chiefs, Major County Sheriffs Associations, 2007). Each of these concerns 
must be addressed to fully facilitate the response of law enforcement officers. After the 
September 11 response and again after Hurricane Katrina, law enforcement officials 
questioned the coverage for workers compensation and pensions (Major City Chiefs, 
Major County Sheriffs Associations, 2007, p. 4). While some of the mutual aid systems 
discussed herein provide answers to these questions, law enforcement authority is an 
issue that must be addressed to have an effective system for meeting emergent incidents. 
Concerns regarding liability are frequently voiced by law enforcement officials. 
Some of the mutual aid systems discussed herein address liability among the parties 
providing and receiving law enforcement mutual aid. However, the manner in which 
liability is addressed does not eliminate liability or immunize the officers. Instead 
liability is often retained by the responding party but any lawsuit must occur in the 
jurisdiction from which the responding officer came (Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, n.d.). Retaining liability by the sending agency allows for the law 
enforcement officer to have the defenses, immunities, and protections the law provides 
for the officer’s day-to-day activities. In other cases, liability is indemnified by the 
requesting state (Emergency Management Assistance Compact, n.d.).  
Last, the authority to enforce the law must also be provided so that the law 
enforcement officers will not be violating the constitutional rights of persons within the 
requesting state. This protects the citizens, the officer, and the criminal justice system. If 
the out-of-state officers lacked proper authority many of the actions taken by them could 
be construed as a violation of state and federal constitutional rights. The lack of authority 
could also cause the dismissal of criminal cases for inability to prosecute arising from the 
officers’ lack of proper law enforcement authority. 
There are a number of existing methods of providing law enforcement mutual aid. 
Each has strengths, weaknesses, and may not apply to some circumstances. These 
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methods include congressionally-approved compacts, state statutes, executive orders and 
deputation. 
EMAC and other compacts provide authority to law enforcement officers to 
render mutual aid during disasters and other emergencies. These compacts are limited to 
disasters declared by governors and are not applicable to pre-disaster prevention 
activities.6 Despite language in EMAC, which give law enforcement officers’ full powers 
while responding to mutual aid requests, Louisiana still deputized incoming officers 
during Hurricane Katrina. This gave the perception that Louisiana did not find the grant 
of authority in EMAC adequate leaving open the question whether the grant of authority 
in EMAC is truly effective.  
Some states have used emergency powers and executive orders to provide 
authority to out-of-state law enforcement officers. In the years following the September 
11 attacks in New York City, the governor of New York used amendments to his 
September 11 Emergency Declaration to waive statues, thereby permitting New Jersey 
and Connecticut law enforcement officers to ride trains and ferries into and out of New 
York City to bolster security due to elevated threats (Executive Order 113.83, 2004). This 
allowed the responding state officers to provide seamless protection as they moved back 
and forth across the state lines on the trains and ferries. This solution requires a governor 
to declare a state of emergency (as happened in this example), which may not be legally 
possible or politically desirable in the absence of an imminent threat. Absent a warning of 
impending Mumbai-style attack (and it is likely there would not be much warning), there 
will unlikely be enough time to enact an executive order. 
When the federal government requires assistance from state and local law 
enforcement for NSSEs, the USSS will enter into memoranda of agreement (MOA) with 
state and local law enforcement agencies. These MOAs do not grant law enforcement 
power; rather, they define the relationship between the agencies. In order to provide law 
enforcement power, the USSS will have the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) deputize the 
                                                 
6 Some states have adopted amendments to the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact that 
purport to allow preventative activities. These amendments were not part of the originally congressionally 
approved compact language, leaving a question regarding the effectiveness and legal sufficiency of these 




state and local law enforcement officers as federal marshals to make them capable of 
enforcing federal law. The deputized federal marshals will only be able to enforce state 
laws if the state where they are operating has a statute that grants this power to federal 
marshals (N.J.S. 2A:154-5). While this system has been used by the USSS for a number 
of years, it can be cumbersome and has been shown to have problems, particularly with 
reimbursement of the costs incurred by the responding jurisdictions (Reese, 2009, p. 3). 
This system relies upon multiple steps to demonstrate the power granted beginning with 
the MOA, through the deputizing and then any state statute granting power, all of which 
could be exploited in litigation or criminal defense. 
Some states have enacted statutes that allow municipalities to enter into mutual 
aid agreements with out-of-state law enforcement agencies granting full law enforcement 
power when requested on mutual aid. These laws tend to be limited in geographic scope 
and require advance planning and approval. In addition, these statutes are applicable to 
routine events making them flexible enough to address preventative operations. While 
these laws work well for adjacent communities, the logistics of every municipality in the 
country entering into individual mutual aid agreements makes this an impractical solution 
for large scale events. 
In order to be effective and efficient, the method of providing interstate law 
enforcement mutual aid should:  
1) Be implemented quickly and efficiently; 
2) Be implemented at the lowest possible level; 
3) Provide seamless authority across jurisdictional boundaries; and 
4) Provide for liability, workers compensation and pension 
benefits/protections. 
Any solution must be able to be implemented quickly and efficiently. The need to 
provide quick and efficient law enforcement surge capability in response to an unfolding 
event, such as a Mumbai-style attack, is self-evident. The need for a quick response is 
also required in other situations, such as an elevated threat of terrorist attack. In these 
situations, waiting for an executive order to be issued, waiting for a legislative body to 
approve a new law, or negotiating a contract could significantly delay response and 
jeopardize safety due to the delays inherent in adoption of laws and contracts. 
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The analysis of whether the solution could be quickly implemented requires 
consideration of whether a solution is currently in place and if so does that solution 
allows for quick execution. If the solution is not currently in place, it may be necessary 
for law enforcement agencies to consider, as a preparedness measure, to work with the 
appropriate legislative and executive bodies to enact new authority. 
The solution must be capable of being implemented at the lowest possible level, 
such as the local chief of police or designee. This allows the law enforcement agency 
directly affected by the event to request directly to agencies that they want to provide 
mutual aid. If the solution required the local chief to request aid through the state, which 
in turn requests aid from the adjacent state, which then requests the local jurisdiction to 
respond, this would waste valuable time and discourage the use of the solution.   
The solution must provide for seamless granting of law enforcement power to 
ensure that the responding officers are not concerned with determining whether they 
currently have authority or fall into a gap. Upon the request for aid, the legal framework 
must grant full law enforcement authority to responding officers. This will streamline 
operations and minimize questions of legal authority. To facilitate a response, it is 
necessary to remove doubt of the officers and create trust in the system. 
The solution must also address concerns related to liability, workers 
compensation, and pension benefits. Addressing these concerns will allow the responding 
officers to have peace of mind while responding and would encourage law enforcement 
agencies to participate in the system. If officers have doubts about these issues, it could 
have an effect upon the officers, could impact their ability to be effective.   
It may be feasible to modify one of the existing solutions to a broader range of 
situations; however, this could prove to be difficult. As discussed herein, in order to make 
EMAC applicable to non-disaster situations, it would require additional congressional 
approval and adoption by all of the states that have previously adopted EMAC. It may be 
possible to formulate an “outside the box” solution, such as a congressional enactment 
that would empower any state or territory that previously adopted EMAC to provide 
mutual aid under other circumstances. 
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There is congressional pre-approval for states to “enter into agreements or 
compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in 
the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies….” (4 U.S.C. 112). Given 
the congressional preapproval for such a compact, it would only require that states adopt 
a standard compact. This could prove difficult if the states cannot agree on language for 
the compact. More intriguing may be the language regarding “agreements,” as an 
agreement may not need formal adoption by state legislatures. Assuming that a mutual 
aid agreement could be crafted and pass a legal review in each of the states, such an 
agreement could meet each of the review criteria set forth herein. Similarly, the FEMA 
Administrator possesses broad authority to facilitate the creation and enactment of mutual 
aid compacts among the states with limited congressional approval.  
Some states have successfully adopted laws that allow local governments to enact 
mutual aid provisions with local governments in neighboring states. Other states have 
used executive orders and declarations of emergencies to facilitate cross-border aid. 
While each of these solutions may work for some states, they may not work for all states. 
Examination of each of these solutions will help determine if they are adaptable 
for a Mumbai-style attack. If they do not work well for the Mumbai-style attack, they 
may provide elements that could be used in a new solution. Ultimately, the new solution 
may require time to implement, such as delays for approvals by state legislatures and 
Congress. Given the lead time that may be required, identification of a solution in 




V. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
Authority to provide law enforcement mutual aid is an issue that affects a 
significant number, if not all, of the states and will continue to arise in a variety of 
situations. Elevated terrorism threat levels, NSSE, and other multi-state events will 
continue to occur, and we cannot rule out the possibly of a Mumbai-style attack. While 
some of the existing solutions provide the necessary authority and protections, no one 
solution provides the authority and protections for all types of events. Having a single 
solution would allow law enforcement to concentrate on providing mutual aid and service 
to the public instead of worrying about how to acquire protection and authority.  
As the terrorist threat continues to evolve and new situations occur, such as a 
Mumbai-style attack, it becomes more vital to have all of the frameworks in place that 
will allow for efficient and effective response. No government official or agency wants to 
be identified in a post event report, such as the Congressional post-Katrina report A 
Failure of Initiative, as failing to foresee the obvious need for mutual aid (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2006). In order to prevent such short-sightedness, it is necessary to 
begin a dialog now with regard to the authorities needed to facilitate law enforcement 
response. 
These current issues could be managed through interim solutions. However, the 
need to quickly implement mutual aid may render some of these solutions unworkable. 
This thesis will identify options to allow states and other jurisdictions seeking to improve 
mutual aid to develop new solutions that are capable of being implemented on short 
notice to address evolving threats. 
This thesis will provide the analysis of the provision of law enforcement mutual 
aid and a roadmap for states to consider when the issue becomes more critical. Solutions 
may include MOAs, congressional enactments, and new state laws. While one solution 
that fits all situations might be ideal, it may not be possible to have such a universal tool. 
A solution that addresses the Mumbai-style attack alone may be the final conclusion.  
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VI. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
A. INTERSTATE COMPACTS—EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
ASSISTANCE COMPACT AND INTERSTATE CIVIL DEFENSE AND 
DISASTER COMPACT CASE STUDY 
States have used interstate compacts to provide mutual aid for disaster response, 
notable examples include Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. While 
these responses were generally successful, there were issues with the use of interstate 
compacts for the law enforcement response to these storms. It is not clear that these 
disaster oriented compacts would provide the quick response required for a Mumbai-style 
attack. 
States are required to use congressionally approved compacts when they want to 
enter into contractual arrangements with one another.7 There are two primary nation-wide 
compacts that have been used for responding to disasters over the last 60 years—EMAC 
and ICDDC.8 EMAC is a compact that was ratified by Congress on October 19, 1996 
(P.L. 104-321). The original enactment of the EMAC included 10 states (Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact, n.d.). Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
adoption of EMAC was slow and sporadic. Since the September 11 attacks, all 50 states, 
District of Columbia, and several territories have adopted EMAC (National Emergency 
Management Association, n.d.). 
Created after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, EMAC remedied shortfalls found in the 
interstate response to that hurricane. Beginning as the Southern Regional Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) among 10 states, it was later changed to 
just EMAC and opened up to all the states. The primary considerations underlying 
adoption of SREMAC were related to natural disasters such as Hurricane Andrew, not 
terrorist attacks.  
                                                 
7 As noted above, Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, commonly known 
as the Compact Clause, provides: “No State shall, without the consent of Congress … enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State (U.S. Const. art. I, § 10). This requires states to have the consent 
of Congress to enter into a mutual aid agreement. 
8 Congress has approved other regional mutual aid compacts, such as the National Capital Region 
mutual aid system in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) 
which are not discussed as part of this thesis. 
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EMAC was utilized for the response to the attacks on September 11; however, 
due to the few number of states that had adopted EMAC, a number of different methods 
were used to facilitate the mutual aid response for the attack (Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, 2007). As such, the September 11 response does not provide a good 
study for the use of EMAC. 
Post September 11, EMAC was used on a number of occasions between 2002 and 
2004 in response to hurricanes. The largest use of EMAC to date as well as the largest 
deployment of law enforcement under EMAC was the response to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita in 2005 (National Emergency Management Association, 2006). Thousands of 
law enforcement officers from throughout the United States provided mutual aid during 
these responses (Smith & Rojek, 2006).  
EMAC provides a grant of law enforcement authority: 
Each party state shall afford to the emergency forces of any party state, 
while operating within its state limits under the terms and conditions of 
this compact, the same powers (except that of arrest unless specifically 
authorized by the receiving state), duties, rights, and privileges as are 
afforded forces of the state in which they are performing emergency 
services. (Emergency Management Assistance Compact, n.d.) 
Both the EMAC compact articles, and the implementing protocols adopted by the 
states, are silent as to how this power of arrest is to be granted leaving ambiguity on how 
to provide this authority (National Emergency Management Association, 2007). 
During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the state of Louisiana elected to 
deputize all of the responding law enforcement officers as deputy sheriffs (National 
Emergency Management Association, 2006, p. 3–15). In light of the fact that EMAC 
provides for what appears to be full law enforcement powers, excepting arrest, it is 
unclear why the state of Louisiana determined it was required to also deputize the officers 
as deputy sheriffs. While this additional deputation provided additional certainty as to the 
officers’ authority, it appears wholly unnecessary and superfluous. At a minimum, the 




EMAC assistance is generally requested by the state emergency management 
director that does not have the authority to grant law enforcement powers. EMAC 
provides responders with the same powers they have in their own state “except that of 
arrest unless specifically authorized by the receiving state” (Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, n.d.). What is required for this power to be granted to responders? 
Does it need to be included in the governor’s emergency declaration or merely in the 
request for mutual aid? These answers will vary from state to state based upon state law. 
EMAC has a number of benefits. First, EMAC is a national compact; all 50 states 
are members along with Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of 
Columbia. This nearly universal adoption allows movement of emergency response 
assets, people, and equipment throughout the country.  
Article VII of EMAC provides for coverage of emergency responders for workers 
compensation: 
Each party state shall provide for the payment of compensation and death 
benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that state and 
representatives of deceased members of such forces in case such members 
sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, 
in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were 
sustained within their own state. Article VIII. (Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, n.d.)  
This provision also details the payment of pension and insurance should an officer 
become injured or killed, thereby addressing concerns that individual law enforcement 
officers may have. 
Article VI of EMAC apportions liability among the responding and requesting 
states: 
Officers or employees of a party state rendering aid in another state 
pursuant to this compact shall be considered agents of the Requesting 
State for tort liability and immunity purposes; and no party state or its 
officers or employees rendering aid in another state pursuant to this 
compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on 
the part of such forces while so engaged or on account of the maintenance 
or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith. Good faith in 
this article shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence, or 
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recklessness. (Emergency Management Assistance Compact, n.d., article 
VI)9 
These articles provide standardization and assurance to responders that they are protected 
should an accident occur or should they be sued while in another state. 
For all its benefits, EMAC does have some weaknesses. For law enforcement 
specifically, the fact that most law enforcement assets are owned by local governments 
presents a challenge to deployment under the state-to-state compact. Article VI of EMAC 
limits liability protections to “Officers or employees of a party state” (Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact, n.d.). Regarding the licenses and powers extended to 
responders, Article IV of EMAC limits them to “the emergency forces of any party state” 
(Emergency Management Assistance Compact, n.d.). According to Article IX, 
reimbursement under EMAC is limited to “Any party state rendering aid” (Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact, n.d.). These provisions require that the sending state 
possess the authority to utilize the local assets as part of the overall state response 
otherwise the protections may not apply. 
Response under EMAC is limited to incidents where the governor of the 
requesting state has declared a state of emergency. The requirement for a declaration of 
emergency can be particularly limiting in a situation such as a Mumbai-style attack in 
which a quick response while the attack is ongoing is necessary. In the early stages of 
such an attack, state officials may be unaware of the attack or the severity of the attack 
and may not be prepared to declare a state of emergency. Thus, the EMAC law 
enforcement authority, benefit protections, and liability apportionment would be 
unavailable. 
A compact similar to EMAC is ICDDC, which was authorized by Congress in 
1951 and adopted by approximately half of the states. EMAC was based upon the 
ICDDC, the provisions of EMAC are nearly identical to the ICDDC with a few 
differences. One significant difference is that the ICDDC does not expressly require a 
governor’s declaration of emergency in order to request mutual aid as EMAC does. 
                                                 
9 This provision is internally conflicted, it makes the responders agents of the requesting state 
appearing to shift liability to the requesting state, yet in the next sentence appears to hold the responders 
immune from liability. Regardless, the liability is shifted off of the responders. 
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While there is no explicit requirement for a declaration of emergency, when read as a 
whole, the ICDDC clearly intended that a governor’s declaration is required. Assuming 
that the lack of express declaration language makes the ICDDC different from EMAC, it 
may be possible to use this compact instead of EMAC for law enforcement response to a 
Mumbai-style attack.  
ICDDC has nearly identical provisions that provide for coverage of emergency 
responders for workers compensation as EMAC: 
Article 7. Each party state shall provide for the payment of compensation 
and death benefits to injured members of the civil defense forces of that 
state and the representatives of deceased members of such forces in case 
such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to 
this compact, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or 
death were sustained within such state. (National Center for Interstate 
Compacts, n.d.)  
Similar to EMAC, this provision provides for the payment of pension and 
insurance should an officer become injured or killed.  
The ICDDC has a broader liability immunity provision than EMAC: 
Article 5. No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in 
another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act 
or omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged, or 
on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in 
connection therewith (National Center for Interstate Compacts, n.d.).  
This provision immunizes responding forces from liability rather than transferring 
the liability to the requesting state. While an absolute immunity may be better than a 
transfer of liability to the requesting state, because it removes any possibility of a liability 
finding, both serve the purpose of providing liability coverage for the responding forces. 
The ICDCC is not active in as many states as EMAC is. The ICDDC is currently 
enacted in less than half of the United States.10 As an immediate solution for providing 
law enforcement mutual aid, this limited enactment presents challenges to using the 
                                                 
10 It is difficult to determine all of the states in which the ICDDC is currently effective as it is not 
listed as authority in plans nor do legal research companies accurately track the compact. A number of 
states attempted to rescind the ICDDC when adopting EMAC, however, the terms of the ICDDC requires 
notification by the withdrawing state to notify the other members of the withdrawal. It is not clear that any 
of the states that attempted to rescind have taken this extra step. 
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ICDDC. Some states have adopted sections or amendments that were not part of the 
original congressional enactment of the ICDDC. New York and New Jersey have adopted 
an Article 15 of the ICDDC that purports to extend the reach of the compact to include: 
Incidents, or the imminence thereof, which endanger the health or safety 
of the public and which require the use of special equipment, trained 
personnel or personnel in larger numbers than are locally available in 
order to reduce, counteract or remove the danger. (N.J.S. 38A:20-3.1) 
Similarly, Arizona purports to be “a signatory to Southwestern Caucus 
Supplement to the ICD & DC which provides for mutual aid between Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah. Currently, Nevada and Utah are 
not signatories” (Arizona Division of Emergency Management, n.d.). This Arizona 
supplement is identical to the New York and New Jersey amendment, excepting its title. 
Both the Southwestern and New York/New Jersey amendments purport to be effective in 
any state that has adopted the amendment, thereby increasing the number of states that 
are subject to both.  
These provisions would, on the surface, appear to allow the use of the ICDDC for 
a Mumbai-style attack. However, these additional articles were never approved by 
Congress raising the question of whether it is ultra vires. As such, it could not be relied 
upon without further legal analysis. 
The congressional authorization for the ICDDC was a part of the Civil Defense 
Act of 1950, which was repealed in 1981. This raises significant questions if the 
remaining state enactments of the ICDDC are legally effective.11 Notwithstanding, those 
states that have enacted the ICDDC may be able to utilize it to respond to a Mumbai-style 
attack. 
                                                 
11 This thesis reaches no conclusion on this question and assumes for the purposes of discussion that 
all enactments in accordance with the Civil Defense Act of 1950 are effective. 
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1. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented Quickly and Efficiently; Does It 
Require a Declaration of Emergency or Other Action That May Delay 
Response? 
The provisions of EMAC require the governor to declare a state of emergency in 
order to activate its provisions (Emergency Management Assistance Compact, n.d.).12 
Whether this can be completed in a timely manner will depend upon the type of event 
requiring the EMAC aid. In the case of a hurricane, a governor will ordinarily have 
plenty of warning and opportunity to have a declaration of emergency prepared. In fact, 
depending on the severity, some governors declare states of emergency prior to the 
hurricane making landfall (DiSanto, 2012). In these situations, EMAC is a quick and 
efficient means to facilitate the aid. Since the declaration of emergency is in place pre-
landfall or quickly post landfall, the state is able to request aid quickly. Other states may 
anticipate the need for pre-and post-hurricane aid and have resources pre-identified and 
staged. Hurricane response is one of the most effective uses of EMAC for both general 
emergency management and law enforcement (National Emergency Management 
Association, 2006). 
However, a Mumbai-style attack has very little in common with a hurricane. 
Generally speaking, such an attack will strike without warning. In the event of an attack, 
it is unlikely that a governor would have a declaration of emergency ready to go, 
especially one with sufficient specificity to address the type of attack and the city where 
the attack occurs. It is equally unlikely that other states would have anticipated the need 
to provide aid and have resources pre-identified and staged.   
EMAC may also be unnecessarily bureaucratic and complex in its execution for 
events that are largely local in nature. As discussed below, multiple steps are required for 
the simplest aid request, which may lead to time delays in implementing the mutual aid 
request. Unless EMAC could be implemented through a police department to police 
department request, it will likely be inefficient for a no notice mutual aid event such as a 
Mumbai-style attack. 
                                                 
12 This thesis does not address the Adjutant General (TAG) to TAG agreements that purport to use 
EMAC as their basis. These agreements indicate that several of the articles of EMAC do not apply to the 
agreement including the requirement for a governor’s declaration of emergency. Whether an agreement can 
waive a statutory requirement on its face appears to be ultra vires. 
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The ICDDC’s lack of a requirement for a governor’s declaration of emergency 
provides an advantage over EMAC with regard to the speed of enactment. Since the 
governor does not have to formally declare an emergency, ICDDC could be activated 
over the phone or through emergency communications channels. This would allow 
emergency assets to be responding instead of waiting. It would also be more likely that a 
governor would be willing to delegate authority to enact the ICDDC than to declare a 
state of emergency. This could facilitate an even faster response, especially in the states 
where the Southwestern and New York/New Jersey amendments are effective, assuming 
they are legal. However, given the legal questions surrounding the ICDDC and the 
amendments, reliance upon ICDDC may be misplaced. 
Notwithstanding the speed advantage that the ICDDC has over EMAC, it is also 
subject to challenges as a solution to providing quick mutual aid to a Mumbai-style 
attack. Most significantly, due to its limited adoption, the ICDDC is only available to 
those states that have it currently adopted. In the example of an attack in Philadelphia, if 
both New Jersey and Pennsylvania do not have the ICDDC currently enacted, it is 
unavailable as a solution.  
Given what has been has been laid out above, neither EMAC nor ICDDC could 
be implemented quickly for rapid local law enforcement mutual aid. This makes this 
solution incapable of being quickly and efficiently implemented. 
2. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented at the Lowest Possible Level, Such 
as the Local Police Chief or Sheriff? Does It Require Application to 
State or Federal Government Officials to Implement? 
EMAC is a state-to-state compact. This means that requests cannot be 
implemented at the local level; all requests must go through the state. Using the 
Philadelphia example, once the attack commences, the Governor of Pennsylvania must 
declare an emergency and then the city of Philadelphia must request that the 
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Office request mutual aid. The state of 
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Office would then make a request of the state of 
New Jersey who would in turn request the city of Camden to provide the aid. If the city 
of Camden agrees, the state of New Jersey would enter into a contract, known as a “Req-
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A” with the state of Pennsylvania. Once the contract is signed, the aid may proceed 
(National Emergency Management Association, n.d.). This process demonstrates that 
EMAC cannot be implemented at the lowest possible level. 
The ICDDC does not have standing procedures for implementation, but were such 
procedures developed, they would likely be similar. ICDDC is also a state-to-state 
compact and therefore would still require the states to be involved in its execution. Since 
both of these compacts are state-to-state, neither is capable of being implemented at the 
lowest level (local). The provisions of the compacts require that the state request aid from 
other states. This would prevent a quick response across state lines from the lowest level, 
such as police chief to police chief. 
3. Is a Clear Grant of Seamless Authority Provided to the Law 
Enforcement Agencies Responding to a Request for Mutual Aid? 
It is not clear that EMAC provides adequate law enforcement authority across 
state lines. During Hurricane Katrina, the State of Louisiana deputized law enforcement 
officers responding pursuant to EMAC (National Emergency Management Association, 
2006, p. 3–15). More recently, during the response to Hurricane Sandy, the State of New 
Jersey held a swearing in ceremony for out-of-state law enforcement officers responding 
under EMAC (State of New Jersey, 2012). In neither case is it clear why the state found it 
necessary to deputize or swear in the responding officers in addition to utilizing EMAC.  
If the EMAC articles provide for the provision of law enforcement authority, 
including the power of arrest when specifically authorized, why would it be necessary to 
take the extra step of deputizing or swearing in the responding officers? The Major City 
Chiefs Police Association (MCC) recognized this infirmity in developing a concept paper 
for Law Enforcement Deployment Teams (Major City Chiefs, Major County Sheriffs 
Associations, 2007, p. 1). The MCC recommended creation of pre-event law enforcement 
surge teams to provide support during natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and high threat 
situations (Major City Chiefs, Major County Sheriffs Associations, 2007). These teams 
are recommended to be deployed under EMAC. However, MCC observes: 
Wherever legally permissible, Requesting States and jurisdictions should 
have procedures in place to have responding officers sworn in by the 
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Requesting State or jurisdiction upon arrival, granting them the same 
authority, rights and immunities applicable to officers of the Requesting 
State or jurisdiction whether established under local, state or federal law. 
(Major City Chiefs, Major County Sheriffs Associations, 2007, Appendix 
A, p. ii) 
This again raises questions as to whether the provisions of EMAC are sufficient to 
allow for law enforcement mutual aid, particularly in regards to the authority under which 
the law enforcement officers operate. As the ICDDC language is virtually identical to the 
provisions of EMAC, it too suffers from the same questions regarding cross jurisdictional 
empowerment. It would not provide an alternative to EMAC for the grant of law 
enforcement powers. Given that states have questioned the grant of law enforcement 
authority during EMAC responses, it is not clear that these compacts provide a seamless 
grant of law enforcement power across state lines.  
4. Does The Solution Delineate Responsibility for Liability, Workers 
Compensation and Other Benefits? 
As noted above, both EMAC and the ICDDC have provisions that provide for 
liability, workers compensations, pension benefits, and protection. Each compact 
addresses the issues differently, but they both address them in a manner that a responding 
law enforcement agency would have certainty regarding these issues. 
Immunity from liability is provided by both compacts through their 
congressionally approved articles. While there may be a question whether EMAC 
provides an outright immunity or merely transfers all liability to the requesting state, it is 
clear that the officers and employees of the responding state are free from liability 
concerns. In addition, personal injury, death benefits and pensions are all retained by the 
responding state as if the individual responders were in their home state. This allows the 
responding law enforcement officers to be certain about their benefits should something 
unfortunate happen.  
Generally speaking, compacts provide a seamless grant of authority, 
notwithstanding the duplicative swearing in some states have utilized under EMAC. 
Compacts also delineate responsibility for liability, workers compensation, and other 
benefits. However, the compacts require the declaration of an emergency and are not 
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quick to implement or capable of being implemented at the lowest possible level. While 
amendments to EMAC or the adoption of a new compact would remedy these issues, 
such action would require adoption by all members of the compact and possible 
congressional action. 
B. EXECUTIVE ORDERS—NEW JERSEY, CONNECTICUT AND NEW 
YORK CASE STUDY 
In order to overcome some of the shortfalls presented by interstate compacts, 
some states have used executive orders to extend law enforcement powers to out-of-state 
law enforcement responding to a specific or general threat. These executive orders are 
intended to allow the seamless movement of law enforcement forces across state lines in 
response to elevated threat levels and other events. The executive orders have generally 
worked well for their desired purpose; however, it is not clear that these executive orders 
would provide the quick response required for a Mumbai-style attack. 
In March 2003, intelligence and information indicated that Al Qaeda was 
considering an attack on the New York City commuter rail system (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006). Also during this time, the United States was preparing to 
engage in war in Iraq. Based on these events, the Department of Homeland Security 
raised the threat level to orange (DHS, n.d. a). The rail attack was believed to involve 
hydrogen cyanide gas, and it was expected to occur in mid to late March (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006). Given the nature of the metropolitan New York commuter rail 
system, it was impossible to know where the terrorists would access the system. 
Hundreds of stations feed the system spread across three states: New Jersey, Connecticut, 
and New York. 
In New York City, there is an underground subway system along with a number 
of regional rail systems that enter the New York underground and connect with the 
subway in common or linked stations (Metropolitan Transportation Authority, n.d.). The 
commuter rail systems board passengers outside of New York City and discharge many 
of the passengers in terminals in New York City. The New Jersey Transit and Long 
Island Rail Road systems bring passengers into Pennsylvania Station in New York City. 
This is also the location of a Metropolitan Transportation Authority Subway Station.  
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Both New Jersey and New York state officials wanted to have law enforcement 
officers on board the trains to help secure the system and deter or prevent a terrorist 
attack. However, the state grant of law enforcement authority in New Jersey, Connecticut 
and New York terminates at their respective state’s border. This means New Jersey or 
Connecticut law enforcement officers would lose their state granted law enforcement 
authority upon reaching the state border. In the case of New Jersey, that border was 
encountered in train tunnels deep beneath the Hudson River, offering no opportunity to 
depart the train at the border. The dilemma presented was whether to disembark the train 
at the last stop in New Jersey or continue into New York City, in full uniform, and hope 
that law enforcement action was not required until the officer was safely back in New 
Jersey. Were an officer to be required to take action while riding the train outside of the 
officer’s home state, it is unclear what authority may be exercised. 
In order to remedy this situation, then New York Governor Pataki declared a state 
of emergency13 and deputized New Jersey and Connecticut law enforcement officers as 
New York State Railroad Police Officers14 (Executive Order 113.83, 2004). Governor 
Pataki waived statutory requirements regarding recruitment and training of railroad police 
officers in order to make this grant of power effective (Executive Order 113.83, 2004) In 
addition to the typical command and control emergency powers, the governor of New 
York has the ability to waive statutes in order to best respond to the emergency. In this 
case, it was determined that deputizing the out-of-state law enforcement officers as 
railroad police was the best way to provide seamless protection on the trains into New 
York City. Governor Pataki recognized that complete police authority was important 
when he stated, “The order I have signed today will allow both uniformed and plain-
clothes officers from Connecticut and New Jersey to ride the PATH and Metro North 
                                                 
13 Governor Pataki modified the existing September 11, 2001 emergency that had been continued in 
effect until this time.  
14 Railroad police obtain authority under a hybrid of state and federal laws. Many railroad police 
officers, regardless of which state they are empowered by, have full law enforcement authority along the 
entirety of the rail system (N.J.S. 48:3-38). Inadequacies in federal pensions and other benefits have caused 
many states to convert the federal railroad police forces into state railroad police with the grant of authority 
ending at the state border. While not addressed here, the model of authority granted presents another 
possible solution to the interstate law enforcement dilemma. 
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with complete police authority in New York State” (Office of Media Relations, New 
York State, 2003). 
The suspected attack did not materialize. Regardless, the leadership of New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and New York realized that partnership was required to protect rail 
transit as it crossed state borders. This was not the only time that the governor of New 
York used a declared emergency to provide for law enforcement authority on interstate 
transportation with New Jersey and Connecticut.  
Later in 2003, a threat for the Times Square New Year’s Eve celebration required 
similar grants of law enforcement authority. In mid-December 2003, intelligence and 
information again indicated that there were threats of attacks within the United States, 
which caused the Department of Homeland Security to raise the threat level to orange 
(DHS, n.d. a). Then Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, stated that the risk of 
attack was at perhaps the highest since September 11, 2001 (Minnis, 2003). On the heels 
of this dire warning and in recognition of the increase in holiday travel into and around 
New York City, the governors of New Jersey and New York took action to increase the 
police presence on mass transit. This time, it was not just New York that entered an 
executive order. 
Governor Pataki again used the September 11, 2001 declaration of emergency to 
deputize New Jersey and Connecticut law enforcement officers as railroad police officers 
(Executive Order 89, 2003). New Jersey Governor, James McGreevey, also used his 
executive powers to convey a grant of authority to New York law enforcement officers 
issuing an executive order declaring a state of emergency. This executive order used 
EMAC and ICDDC to request mutual aid of New York and grant full law enforcement 
powers to New York law enforcement officers riding trains into the state of New Jersey 
(Executive Order 89, 2003). Unlike a typical EMAC response, the executive order and 
grant of power did not provide for reimbursement of the responding forces costs nor did 
it require a specific request or mission to be accomplished. Instead, the out-of-state law 
enforcement officers were given full discretion to determine when and where they would 
ride on the trains. 
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Again, this threat failed to materialize, the threat level was lowered and the 
amendment to the New York executive order was allowed to lapse. While the New York 
executive order in effect expired after 30 days, New Jersey had no similar provision and 
this executive order has not been repealed.15 This was not the last time the three states 
needed to address law enforcement authority on interstate transportation. Another threat 
in the summer of 2005 brought about the entering of more executive orders. 
In July 2005, terrorists conducted a coordinated attack on the London 
Underground and bus system, killing 56 and injuring over seven hundred (BBC News, 
2005). Two weeks later, a second coordinated terrorist attack was attempted on the 
London transit system, however, this attack failed and the bombs did not detonate as 
expected (BBC News, 2005). These attacks concerned the governors of New Jersey and 
New York enough that they issued another set of executive orders to address transit 
security. Governor Pataki again used the September 11, 2001 emergency declaration and 
issued an executive order that deputized New Jersey and Connecticut law enforcement 
officers as railroad police to allow them to ride the trains in and out of New York City 
(Executive Order No. 113.99, 2005). Acting Governor Richard Codey of New Jersey also 
issued an executive order; however, this executive order was directed at security on 
ferries16 (Executive Order 43, 2005). The recitations of the executive order referenced an 
increase in the USCG maritime security or MARSEC level as part of the grounds upon 
which the order was based. Governor Codey’s executive order has not been rescinded and 
remains in effect.17 
                                                 
15 As of February 1, 2011, Executive Order 89 (McGreevey) has not been repealed, although the 
underlying threat and the Orange Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level upon which the 
emergency was declared had abated. Additionally, the federal government is moving away from a color 
based HSAS to a localized warning based National Terrorism Alert System (DHS, n.d. b). It is unclear if 
this order can be relied upon in 2011. 
16 There was no mention of the executive order entered by Governor McGreevey in the press release 
that accompanied Governor Codey’s executive order or press coverage. It is assumed that this order was 
believed to still be in effect and conveyed a valid grant of power on the trains in and out of New York. 
17 As of July 11, 2013, Executive Order 44 (Codey) has not been repealed, although the underlying 
threat and MARSEC level upon which the emergency was declared has abated. It is unclear if this order 
can be relied upon in 2014. 
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Subsequent executive orders have been entered by governors of New York to 
provide for law enforcement presence on trains in and out of New York City.18 Most 
recently in 2010, then Governor Paterson declared an emergency based upon terrorist 
targeting of mass transit, the recent attempted bombing in Times Square by Faisal 
Shahzad and the increased ridership due to the holiday season (State of New York, 2010). 
As part of the declaration of emergency, Governor Paterson waived the recruitment and 
training requirements to allow law enforcement officers to patrol the trains (State of New 
York, 2010). This executive order differed from the prior New York orders as it did not 
rely upon the September 11, 2001, emergency declaration for its authority and instead 
declared a state of emergency. 
As a solution to providing law enforcement authority across state lines, executive 
orders have proved effective for the last eight years but present interesting legal and 
policy concerns. With the exception of 2010 issuance, each of the New York executive 
orders was an amendment to the September 11, 2001 declaration of emergency. As the 
time between the original emergency declaration and the subsequent statute waiver 
increases, the risk that a court could find the waiver invalid increases. It is difficult to see 
how a current security threat is related to the September 11, 2001, attacks, which raises 
the question of whether the use of these executive orders for current response is valid. 
1. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented Quickly and Efficiently; Does it 
Require a Declaration of Emergency or Other Action That May Delay 
Response? 
While executive orders prove effective for the response to the terrorist threats 
facing the New York metropolitan area, they require the governor to issue an executive 
order. Governors may be hesitant to enact an executive order based upon uncertain 
intelligence as public perception may be that issuance of an executive order gives 
credibility to the threat of an attack and may cause panic. Therefore, an attack may be 
underway before a governor could issue the executive order. However, if a governor 
could enact an order as a preparedness measure when there was no immediate threat, this 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that these are only select examples; other executive orders have been entered for 
this same purpose. 
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could mitigate the perception of credibility. This would require that the state laws allow 
for such a pre-event order. 
The issuance of executive orders takes time. Even where a governor has a 
template order prepared, the order must be conformed to the current situation, cleared, 
and then signed by the governor. Once signed, the order may then be acted upon once it 
has been communicated to the responders in the affected areas. In the event two states 
have standing reciprocal orders, such as those in New Jersey and New York, the time 
delay is largely eliminated and the response can be implemented quickly. 
2. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented at the Lowest Possible Level, Such 
As The Local Police Chief Or Sheriff? Does It Require Application to 
State or Federal Government Officials to Implement? 
A governor’s executive order cannot be implemented at the local level. Police 
departments must reach out to the governor’s office, often through several levels of 
bureaucracy such as counties or the state emergency management agency. While this may 
be convenient for anticipated events, it would not be convenient for a Mumbai-style 
attack when quick mutual aid is required.  
However, was a governor to have a standing executive order that was not threat 
dependent, local police departments could be empowered to act quickly without waiting 
for gubernatorial action. In the New Jersey/New York example, the law enforcement 
agencies were able to respond as needed. While the duration of the New York order was 
limited, while it was in effect it allowed implementation at all levels of government. 
In order to have a standing executive order, a governor would need to have the 
authority to issue such an order granting law enforcement power. This authority would 
need to allow the governor to issue the order in the absence of an emergency or active 
threat. 
3. Is a Clear Grant of Seamless Authority Provided to the Law 
Enforcement Agencies Responding to a Request for Mutual Aid? 
As executive orders involve action by the chief executive of a state, the governor, 
they should provide seamless authority across the state lines. However, this assumes that 
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the governor is empowered to grant this authority.19 Executive orders provide for 
seamless authority as the governor is extending the authority of that governor’s state to 
the responding forces. In order to demonstrate that the governor is authorized to extend 
authority and that the executive order provides a seamless grant of authority, a legal 
analysis or memorandum from the state attorney general or legal officer would likely be 
required. This could be a one-time opinion that would provide the foundation for the 
grant of authority. 
4. Does the Solution Delineate Responsibility for Liability, Workers 
Compensation and Other Benefits? 
Indirectly executive orders provide certainty for liability, workers compensation, 
and pension benefits by having the sending jurisdiction retain all of them. The responding 
officers remain employed by the sending agency and would be covered by their agency’s 
workers compensation and pension policies and systems.20 
In terms of liability, however, this solution leaves some questions. While 
operating in their home state, law enforcement officers are protected by a variety of laws, 
such as the state tort claims act. Once that officer crosses into a different state, the home 
state liability laws and protections may no longer apply. Home state tort claims act 
protections may no longer apply. The officer may be subject to the requesting state’s 
liability laws and protections. However, it would be for a court to determine whether the 
responding officer could utilize the requesting state liability protections. This could have 
the unintended consequence of having states, local jurisdictions, and their law 
enforcement officers subject to foreign laws and without protection. 
On the surface, executive orders from a governor provide a seamless grant of 
authority. While not necessarily explicitly expressed, the executive orders provide for 
liability, workers compensation and other benefits by having the responding state retain 
responsibility. Executive orders are generally not quick to implement as a governor is 
                                                 
19 In order to determine the authority of the governors, a state-by-state analysis would need to be 
conducted. For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the governor has such power. 
20This thesis only provides an overview of legal concepts and should not be relied upon as legal 




required to enact the order. Because they are enacted by the governor, they do not allow 
implementation at the lowest possible level.  
C. MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT—NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY 
EVENT CASE STUDY 
Memoranda of agreement (MOA) can provide for liability, workers 
compensation, and other benefits by providing federal coverage. Some MOA, such as 
those used for NSSEs, can provide a limited grant of law enforcement authority through 
the use of deputation, such as by the USMS; however, a deputation that is limited in 
terms of the state and local laws that can be enforced. MOAs are not quick to implement 
they must be approved by government officials, such as town councils or county boards 
of commissioners, to properly grant the power. This system is quite good for the planned 
events it is designed for, but it does not provide any benefits for no notice events. 
NSSEs are events that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines require 
enhanced security due to the threat of terrorism or other criminal action (DHS, 2008a). 
This determination is based upon: attendance by government officials and dignitaries; the 
overall size of the event; and the significance of the event. Once an event is determined to 
be a NSSE, the USSS is the lead agency for planning the security for the event 
(Information Sharing, 2007). 
The USSS is authorized by statute and presidential directive to provide security 
for events of national significance. President Clinton originally assigned this 
responsibility to the USSS in a classified presidential decision directive (PDD) (White 
House, 1998).21 According to the USSS, PDD 62 “formalized and delineated the roles 
and responsibilities of federal agencies in the development of security plans for major 
events” (Information Sharing, 2007). This included making the USSS the lead agency for 
what is now known as NSSEs. This directive was superseded by a classified appendix to 
National Security Presidential Directive 46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15 
                                                 
21 PDD 62 is a classified document and has not been reviewed as part of this thesis, the statements 




(NSPD46/HSPD15),22 which maintains the “USSS responsibility in planning, 
coordinating, and implementing security operations at NSSEs” (Reese, 2009).  
This duty was further bolstered in the Presidential Protection Act of 2000 that 
gave the USSS the ability to “participate ... in the planning, coordination, and 
implementation of security operations at special events of national significance....” 
(Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, Pub.L. 106-544, 1999). While this act does 
not provide a direct USSS leadership role in NSSE, read in conjunction with the 
unclassified interpretations of PDD 62 and NSPD46/HSPD15, it is clear the USSS is 
responsible for leading the planning of NSSE. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security, as directed by the president, designates 
events as NSSE and the USSS assumes it role as the coordinator of the security for the 
event (Reese, 2009, p. 1). As noted previously, events that are typically designated as 
NSSE include Presidential inaugurations, Presidential funerals, Presidential nominating 
conventions, international economic summits, and major sporting events (Reese, 2007, 
p. 4).  
Once an NSSE is designated, the USSS coordinates with federal, state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement and public safety agencies in the jurisdiction where the NSSE will 
take place (Information Sharing, 2007; Narr, Toliver, Murphy, McFarland, & 
Ederheimer, 2006). If additional law enforcement is needed, the USSS will work with the 
host jurisdiction to provide federal law enforcement and mutual aid from other states 
(Narr et al., 2006). The state and local law enforcement officers are deputized as federal 
marshals to provide extraterritorial law enforcement authority (Reese, 2009). Prior to 
2012, the U.S. Department of Justice provided reimbursement to the out-of-state law 
enforcement partners (Reese 2009). Beginning in fiscal year 2012, FEMA was 
appropriated limited funding to “provide supplemental federal assistance to state, local, 
tribal, and territorial governments for certain actual costs of providing emergency 
management, public safety, and security during the preparation and conduct of an NSSE” 
(FEMA, 2013).  
                                                 
22 Similarly, the classified portions of NPSD46/HSPD15 have not been reviewed as part of this thesis, 
rather all statements regarding the NSPD/HSPD are based upon the unclassified sources cited. 
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This is the method that has been used for numerous events over the years and has 
proved a workable solution to planned events. While it does take some time to put all the 
pieces in place, the USSS has optimized the process and made it fairly easy to implement. 
There have been approximately 40 NSSEs or equivalent events since the enactment of 
PDD-62 in 1998. This has allowed the USSS to memorialize the process and replicate it 
throughout the country. 
A typical NSSE is designated several months to a year prior to the event. Upon 
designation of the event as a NSSE, the USSS will meet with the relevant state, local, 
tribal, and territorial stakeholders to begin the planning process (Narr et al., 2006). A 
number of committees are formed to plan for the various contingencies that could be 
present during the NSSE. While the committees vary from event to event, typically law 
enforcement, health and medical, media and public affairs, and legal committees are 
used.  
The public safety sub-committee determines the amount of law enforcement that 
would be required for the event and then works with the host jurisdictions to identify 
sufficient assets to meet this need. The USMS enters into a MOA with the sending 
agency that details law enforcement authority, benefits, liability, and funding. 
For the 2009 presidential inauguration, the “USSS obtained assistance from 
nearly 30,000 law enforcement officers from 58 federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies for the events” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 
General, 2009, p. 3). This required 58 separate MOAs to coordinate all these law 
enforcement agencies, a daunting task that is achievable when there is sufficient lead 
time. 
The USMS has authority to deputize state and local law enforcement officers as 
Special Deputy U.S. Marshals (28 U.S.C. § 561). This deputation provides the deputized 
officer with the authority to enforce federal laws, protect foreign dignitaries, and other 
typical powers provided to USMS (Narr et al., 2006). What is not provided is the express 
ability to enforce state and local laws as this power is granted by the states. While 




The 2009 Presidential Inauguration MOA provided:  
B. Deputation 
All local and state law enforcement personnel designated to the PITF 
[Presidential Inauguration Task Force] will be subject to background 
inquiry and will be federally deputized, with the United States Marshals 
Service securing the required deputation authorization. These deputations 
will remain in effect throughout the tenure of each officer’s assignment to 
the PITF or until termination of the PITF, whichever occurs first. Each 
individual deputized as a Special U.S. Marshal will have all necessary law 
enforcement authority as provided by 28 U.S.C. 566(c) and (d); 28 U.S.C. 
564, 18 U.S.C. 3053, 28 C.F.R. 0.112, and the deputation authority of the 
Deputy Attorney General. The Special Deputy U.S. Marshals will be 
responsible for 1) performing necessary law enforcement steps to keep the 
peace of the United States; 2) enforcing federal law (e.g., 18 U.S.C. 112, 
1116, and 878, as well as other provisions of that title); 3) protecting 
visiting foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected 
persons; 4) taking necessary law enforcement steps to prevent violations 
of federal law, and; 5) enforcing District of Columbia law as a result of the 
deputation (see D.C. Code and 28 U.S.C. 564). (Narr et al., 2006)  
This provides for both the enforcement of federal law and law pursuant to Washington, 
DC. 
In order to determine the extent of the USMS ability to enforce state or local law, 
it is necessary to examine the state laws where the event or incident is taking place. In 
New Jersey, for example, crimes of the third degree23 or higher may be enforced by 
USMS pursuant to statute (N.J.S 2A:154-5). The law provides this power absent a 
trigger, it is granted to all USMS all the time (N.J.S. 2A:154-5). In practical terms, this 
means that the deputized officer may enforce state laws that are of the third degree or 
higher but may not enforce fourth degree crimes, such as shoplifting, or disorderly 
persons offenses (N.J.S. 2C:20-11). New Jersey law allows law enforcement officers to 
enforce orders issued by the governor during a declared state of emergency. A violation 
                                                 
23 New Jersey uses degrees to tier its crimes. The New Jersey Judiciary explains this: 
A First degree crime carries the potential penalty of 10-20 years in prison. A Second 
degree crime carries a potential penalty of 5-10 years. Defendants who are convicted of 
first and second degree crimes face a presumptive term of incarceration. It is assumed 
that they will be sentenced to serve time in prison. A Third degree crime may result in 3-
5 years if convicted, while Fourth degree crimes carry a potential penalty of up to 18 
months in jail. There is a presmption [sic] of non-custodial sentences on 3rd and 4th 
degree offenses. (2014) 
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of these orders is a disorderly person’s offense or a minor crime usually punishable by 
fine and less than eighteen months in jail (N.J.S. App A:9-49). Under this construct, a 
special deputy federal marshal can enforce serious crimes and federal law but 
enforcement of disorderly person’s offenses, such as the governor’s emergency orders, is 
beyond the special deputy federal marshal’s authority (N.J.S. App A:9-49). 
1. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented Quickly and Efficiently; Does It 
Require a Declaration of Emergency or Other Action That May Delay 
Response? 
As the USSS has been planning for NSSEs or equivalent since 1998, it has 
developed a streamlined system that allows for the large surge in law enforcement 
required for the NSSEs. For these events, the USSS has the luxury of time and planning 
in developing procedures and methods to accomplish planning such events for maximum 
effectiveness. Given the complexity of the layered approach, the NSSE system cannot be 
implemented quickly. Even were it possible to designate an attack or other unplanned 
event as an NSSE, the MOA, deputation, and state law reliance may not be in place to 
allow the response. None of these can easily be implemented as an event is unfolding. 
The system used for an NSSE to provide law enforcement mutual aid provides a 
clear chain of command and structure for the responding mutual aid. Built as a team, the 
NSSE provides clear structure as the team members know their position in the 
organization. Each jurisdiction is included in the overall plan that outlines roles and 
responsibilities (Narr et al., 2006). The MOA also defines the roles and responsibilities of 
the jurisdictions and for the operational command of the units. This provides for a clear 
chain of command for the event. The NSSE MOA and planning system works extremely 
well for planned events, however, due to the requirement for local authorities to engage 
the USSS and USMS, it does not provide the quick and efficient implementation required 
for response to a Mumbai-style attack. 
2. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented at the Lowest Possible Level, Such 
as the Local Police Chief or Sheriff? Does It Require Application to 
State or Federal Government Officials to Implement? 
Since deputation by the USMS is required, along with MOAs spelling out the 
terms and conditions of the deputation, this solution cannot be implemented at the lowest 
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level. A local police department would be reliant upon USMS or USSS to enter into the 
MOA and then to provide the deputation implementing the cross border grant of 
authority. In order to address an unplanned and rapidly unfolding event such as a 
Mumbai-style attack, the local police department would either need a standing MOA with 
USMS/USSS or it would need to reach out to the USMS/USSS as the event was 
occurring to attempt to negotiate a MOA. 
It is reasonable to assume that the USMS would not want to have permanent 
deputation of law enforcement officers nationwide. However, this presents challenges in 
responding to unexpected events. If the deputation of the responding officers could not be 
completed in advance, it would be necessary for local police departments to contact the 
USMS before responding to an attack in another state in order to get deputized. This is 
impractical and would delay the response. The MOA and deputation cannot be 
implemented at the lowest level as action by the USSS and USMS is required in order to 
provide the deputation. This makes the MOA process for NSSE untenable for required 
implementation at the lowest level in the event of a Mumbai-style attack. 
3. Is A Clear Grant Of Seamless Authority Provided To The Law 
Enforcement Agencies Responding To A Request For Mutual Aid? 
The NSSE system provides a clear grant of law enforcement authority through the 
deputation from the USMS. While the deputation may be limited to certain types of 
crimes, it is clear, unambiguous, and supported by statutory authority (28 U.S.C. § 561). 
The NSSE system is complex and relies upon a series of MOA and actions by local, state, 
and federal officials to create the authority and protections. In order to enforce state and 
federal law, the responding jurisdiction must have: 
1) A memorandum of agreement detailing the roles and responsibilities of the 
requesting and responding jurisdictions; 
2) Deputation by the USMS and, 
3) A state law that allows enforcement of state and local laws by USMS. 
It is extremely unlikely that all of these will be in place on a routine basis in anticipation 
of an event such as a Mumbai-style attack. 
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The most significant hurdle to the NSSE approach is that the ability to enforce 
laws is limited by the authority of USMS and the grant to the USMS by state laws. Since 
the USMS only have organic authority to enforce federal law, examination in advance of 
the state law grant to the USMS is required. In New Jersey, as discussed above, this 
power is limited to third degree or higher crimes. 
During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Justice discovered 
that the grant of state law enforcement power to federal officers was not as broad as had 
been previously anticipated. After the immediate response was over, the Attorney 
General requested that all the governors examine their laws to assure that federal law 
enforcement could enforce state and local laws should they be needed in an emergency 
(Gonzales, 2007). It is unclear whether states took action to remedy any gaps in their 
laws. 
Given that a special deputy federal marshal can only enforce those laws that are 
authorized by the requesting state statutes; the deputation will be limited and varied. 
While the authority of the USMS to deputize is clear and unambiguous, the extent of the 
laws permissible to be enforced is not clear. This ambiguity makes the grant of authority 
provided under the MOA and deputation insufficient for response to a Mumbai-style 
attack. 
4. Does the Solution Delineate Responsibility for Liability, Workers 
Compensation and Other Benefits? 
The NSSE system provides for some coverage for injuries sustained through the 
MOA signed by all parties. The MOA provides for federal coverage for death or 
disability: 
Individuals deputized as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals pursuant to this 
MOA who suffer a disability or die as a result of personal injury sustained 
while in the performance of his or her duty during the assignment shall be 
treated as a federal employee as defined by Title 5 U.S.C. Section 8101. 
Any such individuals who apply to the U.S. Department of Labor for 
federal workers’ compensation under Section 3374 must submit a copy of 
this MOA with his or her application. All applicants will be processed by 
the U.S. Department of Labor on a case by case basis in accordance with 
applicable law and regulation. (Narr et al., 2006) 
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The MOA is silent as to liability and workers compensation protection short of 
disability. It is reasonable to infer that this coverage remains with the sending 
jurisdiction. The MOA provides that liability remains with the sending jurisdiction unless 
covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act (Narr et al., 2006).  
As the designation and coordination of a NSSE is a duty of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, this is not an option available to a state or local law enforcement 
agency should a sudden emergency arise. The NSSE designation is for planned events 
(DHS, 2008a). 
NSSE memoranda of agreement provide for liability, workers compensation, and 
other benefits by providing federal coverage. In addition, the NSSE MOA provide a 
limited grant of law enforcement authority through the use of deputation by the USMS— 
a deputation that is limited in terms of the state and local laws that can be enforced. The 
NSSE MOA are not quick to implement as action by the federal government is required 
to grant the power. It also does not allow implementation at the lowest possible level as 
the facilitation of mutual aid is provided for through the federal government. This system 
is quite good for the planned events it is designed for, but it does not provide any benefits 
for no notice events such as a Mumbai-style attack. 
D. STATE LAWS—EXAMPLE: MONTANA 
State laws that allow for the establishment of mutual aid agreements across state 
lines could be quick to implement provided the local jurisdictions have enacted the 
appropriate MOA in advance of the no notice event. State laws allow enactment and 
implementation at the lowest possible level as all necessary agreements and requests are 
made by the local governments. Additionally, state laws provide a seamless grant of law 
enforcement authority; however, this grant will be dependent upon each state’s law. 
Furthermore, state laws often require provisions to be included in MOAs detailing the 
coverage for liability, workers compensation, and other benefits. Provided that the 
requesting state has the appropriate laws enacted and the local jurisdictions have enacted 
MOAs, this approach would be good for a Mumbai-style attack. 
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A number of states have enacted laws permitting local jurisdictions within the 
state to enter into mutual aid agreements with communities in other states. This allows a 
one-on-one mutual aid relationship between local law enforcement agencies in different 
states. Some of the laws are limited to communities along the state border such as 
Tex.Crim. Pro. § 2.124. Others are broader and could extend to any law enforcement 
agency in any state, such as (Montana Code § 44-11-301 et seq.). The mutual aid 
relationship will only be one way- into the state that has enacted the law. 
One example of this type of law is the Montana Interstate Law Enforcement 
Mutual Aid Act that allows for cross border mutual aid. The Montana Act allows any law 
enforcement agency in the state of Montana to enter into mutual aid agreements with any 
law enforcement agency in another state. The agreement and the state law give the out-
of-state agency providing mutual aid full law enforcement authority within the requesting 
Montana jurisdiction. 
The purpose of the Montana Act is: 
to permit … law enforcement agencies of this state to enter into mutual aid 
agreements, … with one or more law enforcement agencies of any other 
state or the United States in order to facilitate and coordinate efficient, 
cooperative enforcement efforts directed at mutual law enforcement 
problems transcending jurisdictional boundaries and to insure the 
prompt and effective delivery of law enforcement and emergency services 
in areas that, due to geographic remoteness, population sparsity, and 
economic and other factors are in need of an increased law enforcement 
presence [emphasis added]. (Montana Code § 44-11-302).  
While this act is designed to supplement the sparse law enforcement resources in rural 
areas of Montana, the broad language would facilitate law enforcement response in most, 
if not all, circumstances within the state.  
The Montana law requires a written mutual aid agreement approved by the 
governing bodies of the jurisdictions in which each law enforcement agency is located24 
(Montana Code § 44-11-304, n.d.). The act requires the “agreement must fully set forth 
                                                 
24 The Montana Act provides: “If required by applicable law, the agreement must be authorized and 
approved by the governing body of each party to the agreement.” For the purposes of this analysis it is 




the powers, rights, and obligations of the parties to the agreement” (Montana Code § 44-
11-304, n.d.). Once enacted, the mutual aid agreement will grant to the responding party 
the same law enforcement powers as the requesting party while operating within the 
requesting party’s jurisdiction (Montana Code § 44-11-304, n.d.). 
The mutual aid agreement is required to include: 
 the duration or the agreement; 
 the precise organization, composition, and nature of any separate legal 
entity created thereby; 
 the purpose of the agreement; 
 the manner of financing the agreement and establishing and maintaining a 
budget therefor; 
 the method to be employed in accomplishing the partial or complete 
termination of the agreement and for disposing of property upon such 
partial or complete termination; 
 provision for administering the agreement, which may include creation of 
a joint board responsible for such administration; 
 the manner of acquiring, holding, and disposing of real and personal 
property used in the agreement; 
 the minimum standards for law enforcement personnel implementing the 
provisions of the agreement; 
 the respective liability of each party to the agreement for the actions of 
law enforcement officers when acting under the provisions of the 
agreement; 
 the minimum insurance required of each party to the agreement; 
 the exact chain of command or delegation of authority to be followed by 
law enforcement officials acting under the provisions of the agreement; 
 the precise enforcement authority that the peace officers of each party law 
enforcement agency may exercise; and 
 any other necessary and proper matters. (Montana Code § 44-11-305, n.d.) 
Once completed, the agreement must be filed in the office of “(1) each clerk and 
recorder of each county of this state where the principal office of one of the parties to the 
agreement is located; and (2) the secretary of state” within 20 days of enactment 
(Montana Code § 44-11-310, n.d.). This statutory construct provides much of the needed 
structure for a cross border response to a Mumbai-style attack. It provides for quick 
implementation at the local level, grants law enforcement authority, and determines 
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liability and insurance in advance. Notwithstanding the benefits of such a legal 
framework, this system is not capable of being developed and implemented without 
advance planning.  
In order for a system such as this to work, the state that is requesting the aid must 
enact the authority for this type of mutual aid into its statues. Once the law is passed, then 
the individual jurisdictions, the county or local governments, must negotiate the mutual 
aid agreement that provides for all of the terms and conditions required by the law. This 
agreement must be passed by the governing bodies on each side of the border and then 
filed with the appropriate state officials. Only after all of this has been completed and the 
agreement is in place would it be available to be used in a Mumbai-style attack. While 
not impossible, it is highly improbable that such a system could be adopted in less than a 
week, let alone in the crucial hours after an attack begins. 
1. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented Quickly and Efficiently; Does It 
Require a Declaration Of Emergency or Other Action That May 
Delay Response? 
Once enacted by the jurisdictions, state laws allows for quick implementation of 
law enforcement mutual aid at the local level where the immediate aid is required. In the 
example of Camden and Philadelphia, either city would be able to call directly on the 
other to obtain law enforcement mutual aid. Neither would be required to go through a 
bureaucratic chain of command to obtain the mutual aid. Assuming that the requesting 
state had the proper laws in place and the local jurisdictions have an MOA enacted, this 
state law construct would be efficient in providing response to a Mumbai-style attack. 
2. Could Mutual Aid Be Implemented at the Lowest Possible Level, Such 
as the Local Police Chief or Sheriff? Does it Require Application to 
State or Federal Government Officials to Implement? 
State laws provide for quick implementation at the local level where the 
immediate aid is required; this is assuming that the law was passed and the mutual aid 
agreements were entered into prior to the event. Given the time needed for 
implementation of such a system, this method does not assist in the response to a 
Mumbai-style attack unless it was previously been adopted. However, for those 
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jurisdictions with such a framework in place, this is an excellent solution to the 
challenges of law enforcement mutual aid that can be enacted at the lowest level. 
3. Is a Clear Grant of Seamless Authority Provided to the Law 
Enforcement Agencies Responding To a Request for Mutual Aid? 
State laws, such as those in Montana, grant seamless law enforcement authority to 
the officers responding by providing “the precise enforcement authority that the peace 
officers of each party law enforcement agency may exercise” (Montana Code § 44-11-
305, n.d.). Montana’s law allows a grant of law enforcement authority to the officers 
responding under the mutual aid agreements (Montana Code § 44-11-304, n.d.). The 
Montana Act provides the grant of law enforcement authority: 
(3) Subject to 44–11-308, a mutual aid agreement may grant a peace 
officer of any party law enforcement agency acting within the territorial 
jurisdiction of any other party law enforcement agency authority to act as 
if he were a duly appointed and qualified peace officer of the law 
enforcement agency he is assisting. (Montana Code § 44-11-304, n.d.) 
In order to work efficiently for a Mumbai-style attack, both Camden and 
Philadelphia would need the authority to enter into these mutual aid agreements, to allow 
the officers to cross the border in either direction. If only Philadelphia had such 
authorization, Camden could not rely upon the response from Philadelphia despite, its 
ability to respond in the opposite direction. 
4. Does the Solution Delineate Responsibility for Liability, Workers 
Compensation and Other Benefits? 
The Montana law requires the mutual aid agreement to provide for “the respective 
liability of each party to the agreement for the actions of law enforcement officers when 
acting under the provisions of the agreement” assuaging the concerns regarding liability 
(Montana Code § 44-11-305, n.d.). While this provision would provide the local 
governments and law enforcement officers with certainty regarding liability, it could lead 
to some confusion if there is not a standardized MOA in place. For example, if in one 
state, three separate communities each use their state statutes to enter into mutual aid 
agreements with the same community in a second state; it is possible that they would 
have several different MOAs with several different liability provisions. This could result 
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in there being several different scenarios for liability when responding across the border, 
possibly in the same event. This gets even more complicated as additional communities 
also enter into agreements.  
State laws, such as Montana’s, provide for the establishment of mutual aid 
agreements across state lines that are quick to implement in local jurisdictions that have 
enacted MOAs. State laws allow enactment and implementation at the lowest possible 
level as all necessary agreements and requests are made by the local governments who 
require the mutual aid. State laws provide a seamless grant of law enforcement authority; 
however, this grant would be different from state-to-state based on the details of each 
state’s law. State laws often require provisions to be included in MOAs detailing the 
coverage for liability, workers compensation and other benefits. Provided that the 
requesting state has the appropriate laws enacted and the local jurisdictions have enacted 







VII. DISCUSSIONS OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS  
Given the challenges presented by a Mumbai-style attack, there is currently no 
universal solution that would allow for the quick implementation of interstate law 
enforcement mutual aid. Each of the systems examined in this thesis presents challenges 
and requires advanced planning to be capable of being implemented in a no notice 
situation. 
Existing compacts, such as the ICDDC and EMAC, provide a seamless grant of 
authority, notwithstanding the duplicative swearing in some states have utilized. These 
compacts also delineate responsibility for liability, workers compensation, and other 
benefits. However, the compacts are not quick to implement as a governor’s declaration 
of emergency is required. Furthermore, the compacts do not allow implementation at the 
lowest possible level as the facilitation of mutual aid is provided for through the state. In 
order to remedy these issues, the states would need to request Congress to amend the 
compact25 or develop state level authorities to allow quick and low level implementation. 
Executive orders provide a seamless grant of authority as they are enacted by the 
governor, presumably with proper legal authority, thereby providing a grant of law 
enforcement authority at the state level. While not necessarily explicitly expressed, the 
executive orders provide for liability, workers compensation, and other benefits by 
having the responding state retain responsibility. Executive orders are not quick to 
implement as a governor is required to enact the order. They do not allow implementation 
at the lowest possible level as the facilitation of mutual aid is provided for through the 
state. Arguably, a governor could enact an executive order that would provide local 
officials with the authority to request and provide the mutual aid. If such an executive 
                                                 
25 State Attorneys General may want to consider whether Congress intended to allow the states to 
modify the articles of EMAC to facilitate local level response. The adoption of EMAC by Congress 
provides: “The Congress consents to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact entered into by …. 
The compact reads substantially as follows…” Does the use of the word “substantially” allow for 
amendment by the States without further Congressional Action? While Congress expressly reserved the 
right to alter or amend the joint resolution approving EMAC, they also stated that it “shall … (3) be 
construed as understanding that the first paragraph of Article II of the compact provides that emergencies 
will require procedures to provide immediate access to existing resources to make a prompt and effective 
response…” P.L. 104-321 (n.d.). The State Attorneys General may want to consider whether this provision 
allows for local implementation which would render the compact both quick and efficient and capable of 
being implemented at the lowest level. 
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order were permanently in place, this would allow for quick and efficient implementation 
at the lowest possible level. 
NSSE MOA provide for liability, workers compensation, and other benefits by 
providing federal coverage. The NSSE MOA provides a limited grant of law enforcement 
authority through the use of deputation by the USMS—a deputation that is limited in 
terms of the state and local laws that can be enforced. The NSSE MOA are not quick to 
implement as action by the federal government is required to grant the power. It also does 
not allow implementation at the lowest possible level as the facilitation of mutual aid is 
provided for through the federal government. This system is quite good for the planned 
events it is designed for, but it does not provide any benefits for no notice events. 
State laws provide for liability, workers compensation and other benefits by 
setting it forth in the MOA between the parties. State laws could provide a seamless grant 
of law enforcement authority dependent upon terms each state’s law. State laws are quick 
to implement provided the local jurisdictions have enacted the appropriate MOA in 
advance of the no notice event. State laws allow for implementation at the lowest 
possible level as the request for mutual aid is done by the local governments. This system 
could be quite effective at addressing a Mumbai-style attack, provided enough cross 




VIII. ANALYSIS OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES 
One alternative to using existing solutions is to create a new one. Given the 
limitations of the Compact Clause, most new alternatives would require congressional 
approval and adoption by state legislatures. This could be a long process and an uncertain 
one as only about four percent of the bills introduced in Congress are passed each year 
(Analysis Methodology, n.d.). However, a compact would provide the strongest 
framework granting responding officers authority and protections. 
Eliminating congressional approval would speed the process significantly. The 
FEMA Administrator has been given broad powers to facilitate the creation of mutual aid 
compacts between the states. Section 611(h)(2) of the Stafford Act directs the 
Administrator to work with states to develop emergency preparedness compacts (42 
U.S.C. § 5196). Once adopted by the states, these compacts become law unless Congress 
objects or overturns the proposed compact. This section also directs the Administrator to 
work with the states to develop reciprocal legislation to address emergencies. 
The intent of this section of the Stafford Act is to develop emergency 
preparedness compacts and legislation that will facilitate the response to events that 
cannot be handled in their entirety by the assets of one jurisdiction (42 U.S.C. § 5196). 
This is precisely the type of preparedness and pre-planning that is required for a Mumbai-
style event. An interstate compact that would facilitate the quick movement of law 
enforcement assets across state lines would facilitate the quick response to events 
requiring increased law enforcement assets. 
The broad powers of 42 USC 611(h) that detail the power of the FEMA 
administrator to negotiate and approve preparedness compacts between the states are: 
(2) The Administrator may  
(A) assist and encourage the States to negotiate and enter into 
interstate emergency preparedness compacts; 
(B) review the terms and conditions of such proposed compacts 
in order to assist, to the extent feasible, in obtaining 
uniformity between such compacts and consistency with 
Federal emergency response plans and programs; … 
(3) A copy of each interstate emergency preparedness compact 
shall be transmitted promptly to the Senate and the House 
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of Representatives. The consent of Congress is deemed to 
be granted to each such compact upon the expiration of the 
60-day period beginning on the date on which the compact 
is transmitted to Congress. 
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as preventing 
Congress from disapproving, or withdrawing at any time its 
consent to, any interstate emergency preparedness compact. 
(42 U.S.C. § 5196) 
This amounts to congressional pre-approval for interstate preparedness compacts. The 
Stafford Act defines preparedness for this section to include response and recovery 
actions (42 U.S.C. § 5195a). 
Similarly, Congress granted consent to compacts between the states for certain 
law enforcement purposes. Specifically, 4 USC § 112, Compacts between States for 
Cooperation in Prevention of Crime; Consent of Congress, provides: 
(a) The consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or more States to 
enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual 
assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their 
respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish such agencies, joint 
or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such 
agreements and compacts. (4 USC § 112) 
This provision is typically used by states for compacts and agreements26 regarding 
detainers, or the laws related to detention and extradition of criminals across state lines. 
However, both the prevention of crime and the enforcement of criminal laws would be 
part of the response to a Mumbai-style attack.  
Either of these statutes could be used to create a new compact between the states 
that would allow for law enforcement mutual aid without the declaration of an 
emergency. Neither would require the congressional approval associated with a compact. 
Provisions similar to those in the Montana statute could form the basis of this new 
compact. If the compact was to extend to other first responders, the Stafford Act 
provisions would be most appropriate. However, if it is limited solely to law 
enforcement, either may apply. 
                                                 




Were several of the states to develop the framework for an interstate law 
enforcement compact, it could “sit on the shelf” until an opportunity to rush it forward 
were presented. EMAC was adopted by a number of the states between 1996 and 2001, 
but after the attacks of September 11, the remaining legislatures passed the compact in 
the months following the attacks. Congress seems to be more willing to take quick action 
on emergency related legislation in the months after a major disaster. For example, in 
2013, both houses of Congress passed the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act containing 
many pieces of legislation that had been unable to garner enough support to pass absent 
the disaster (Scholtes, 2013). The next major disaster could be an opportunity to pass law 















IX. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The current systems in place that allow for law enforcement mutual will not 
provide quick interstate aid during a Mumbai-style attack. As detailed above, none of the 
mutual aid systems currently in use would allow for response to a Mumbai-style attack. 
Compacts such as EMAC do not allow for quick response as a governor must declare a 
state of emergency before the mutual aid may proceed. Executive orders require action by 
a governor and would not be quickly implemented in response to a Mumbai-style attack. 
MOAs, such as the one used by the USSS for NSSE, are limited in scope and authority 
and do not provide quick implementation or a clear and seamless grant of authority. State 
laws show promise, but they are complex and can result in inconsistent results if 
standardized templates are not developed and enacted.  
Some local jurisdictions may be able to rely upon the state laws and 
accompanying MOA that allows for interstate law enforcement mutual aid, but these are 
the minority. Furthermore, without significant expansion of these systems, there is no 
clear method for law enforcement to respond to a Mumbai-style attack across state lines. 
While many law enforcement agencies may elect to respond despite lack of legal 
authority, there will be significant challenges and other legal issues that follow.  
In order to provide the proper legal framework facilitating interstate response to 
no-notice events, such as a Mumbai-style attack, those associations representing state, 
county, and local law enforcement agencies should develop a law enforcement compact 
that will address the concerns unique to law enforcement mutual aid. These associations 
are best suited to balance the interested of law enforcement agencies from different states 
and amongst the different types of law enforcement agencies. Associations, such as the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, and the 
Major Cities Chiefs Police Association, would be best positioned to take the lead on 
development of this new national compact.  
This new compact would need to be passed by at least two states and then 
submitted to Congress for approval, pursuant to the Compact Clause. While this multi-
layered legislative process may take a considerable amount of time the development of 
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the core principles of the compact today will position law enforcement for quick adoption 
should opportunity present, such as after a major disaster. 
The compact framework must contain the key elements necessary to facilitate 
quick interstate mutual aid. As laid forth in this thesis, the new compact must be capable 
of being implemented quickly and efficiently without bothersome delay of requesting 
permission through multiple layers of government. The new compact must be capable of 
being implemented at the lowest possible level—aid must be able to be requested from 
police chief to police chief27 or mayor to mayor. Streamlining the method by which the 
mutual aid is requested will help achieve order during chaos. This compact must provide 
a clear and seamless grant of law enforcement authority across jurisdictional boundaries 
and make it clear that the responding officers have full law enforcement powers. This 
compact must provide clear understanding of liability, workers compensation, and 
pension benefits, including which agency provides or retains each of these. Providing the 
responding officers with clear authority and an understanding of their protections will 
allow them to fully engage in the response without worrying about their legal exposure. 
This new compact should consider the familiar provisions of the EMAC as a 
known and tested framework. These provisions could be adapted to meet the law 
enforcement community’s needs for responding to a no-notice event. Using similar, if not 
identical provisions, would also allow the new compact to work in concert with EMAC 
when appropriate. The new compact should not adopt EMAC’s requirement that the 
governor declare a state of emergency. While developing the terms of the compact, the 
associations representing state, county, and local law enforcement agencies should 
consider whether the new compact could enhance the law enforcement mutual aid 
response to planned events, natural disasters, and other law enforcement needs.  
State associations representing law enforcement agencies may want to consider 
pursuing adoption of state laws that allow for local cross-border mutual aid agreements 
while a comprehensive national solution is being enacted. This would allow for shorter 
term solutions in areas that may be at higher risk of a Mumbai-style attack. 
                                                 
27 The term police chief is used to represent the leader of the state, county or local law enforcement 
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